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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose and Ee-ct ofJudicial Notice
In its most commonly used sense, judicial notice refers to situations
where the court is justified in declaring the truth of a proposition without
requiring evidence.1 Judicial notice may save time by eliminating the need
to introduce evidence. 2 If only matters that are demonstrably indisputable
are noticed, the chances of factual error are reduced.3 Although some cases
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama; A.B., 1966, J.D., 1969,
University of Illinois; LL.M., 1977, Harvard University.
1. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2565, at 693-94 (J. Chadborn rev. ed. 1981).
See Scheufler v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 886, 895, 169 S.W. 359, 365
(1943); see generally Mo. BAR C.L.E., SOURCES OF PROOF § 7.1 (1977); Thompson,
Evidence, 28 Mo. L. REV. 539, 544-45 (1963); Comment,Judicial Notice in Missouri,
24 Mo. L. REV. 75 (1959). Administrative bodies also use judicial notice. See, e.g.,
Stegeman v. St. Francis Xavier Parish, 611 S.W.2d 204, 209 (Mo. 1981) (en banc)
(Labor and Industrial Relations Commission may apply judicial notice when
proper under rules of evidence); see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.070 (1978) (agencies
shall take official notice of all matters that the courts take judicial notice of, includ-
ing technical or scientific facts, provided the parties are given a reasonable opportu-
nity to respond).
2. NoteJudicial Notice: Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 U. FLA. L.
REV. 723, 724 (1976). See also Judicial Notice-Dispuability and Appellate Practice Re-
gardingJudicial Notice of Stopping Distances, 38 Mo. L. REV. 678, 680 (1973).
3. U. FLA. L. REV., supra note 2, at 724.
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refer to judicial notice as an instrument of judicial reasoning,4 Missouri
courts traditionally have viewed the doctrine as a rule of evidence 5 which
presumes as true the facts noticed6 and eliminates the necessity of formal
proof.7 Ordinarily, facts noticed must be offered as evidence' and become
part of the record. 9 They are treated the same as other factual evidence in
the case, 10 and juries may find these facts without further proof."
The conclusiveness of proof by judicial notice depends upon the cer-
tainty of the source.12 If a fact can be disputed," judicial notice is merely
4. See, e.g., Endicott v. St. Regis Inv. Co., 443 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Mo. 1969)
(judicial notice is either a rule of evidence or an instrument of judicial reasoning).
5. See Randall v. St. Albans Farms, Inc., 345 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Mo. 1961); see
also Ralph D'Oench Co. v. St. Louis County Cleaning & Dyeing Co., 358 Mo. 1072,
1076, 218 S.W.2d 609, 612 (1949) (judicially noticed facts are evidence and thus not
properly considered in judgment on pleadings).
6. See Timson v. Manufacturers' Coal & Coke Co., 220 Mo. 580, 596-97, 119
S.W. 565, 569 (1909) (analogized judicially noticed facts to presumptions).
7. See Rossomanno v. LaClede Cab Co., 328 S.W.2d 677, 683 (Mo. 1959) (en
banc); Schuefler v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 886, 895, 169 S.W.2d 359,
365 (1943); Newson v. City of Kan. City, 606 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980);
Mince v. Mince, 481 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
8. Randall v. St. Albans Farms, Inc., 345 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Mo. 1961). See
Hume v. Wright, 274 S.W. 741, 744 (Mo. 1925) (error to base judgment on facts
noticed but not put in evidence); see also Knorp v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 44, 47, 175
S.W.2d 889, 893 (1943). But see Stimage v. Union Elec. Co., 465 S.W.2d 23, 27
(Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (facts judicially noticed need not be introduced in evidence
and jury may consider them without independent proof).
9. See Randall v. St. Albans Farms, Inc., 345 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Mo. 1961);
Zickefoose v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 579, 594, 148 S.W.2d 784, 792 (1941).
10. Like any other fact in evidence, facts judicially noticed may be rebutted.
Jackson v. Cherokee Drug Co., 434 S.W.2d 257, 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968). See
Ralph D'Oench Co. v. St. Louis County Cleaning & Dyeing Co., 358 Mo. 1072,
1077, 218 S.W.2d 609, 612 (1949).
11. See Morrison v. Thomas, 481 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (judicial
notice does not prevent submitting noticed issue to the jury); see also Kansas City v,
Dugan, 524 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (discretion not abused by failing
to notice article when court neither saw nor was asked to notice); Mo. BAR C.L.E.,
supra note 1, § 7.1.
12. Newson v. City of Kan. City, 606 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
13. Missouri courts consistently suggest that not all judicially noticed facts are
disputable. See Scheufler v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 886, 896, 169
S.W.2d 359, 365 (1943) ("many of the things which are judicially noticed. . . can-
not well be supposed to admit of question"); see also Rossomanno v. LaClede Cab
Co., 328 S.W.2d 677, 683 n.1 (Mo. 1959) (en banc); Timson v. Manufacturers' Coal
& Coke Co., 220 Mo. 580, 597, 119 S.W. 565, 569 (1909); Newson v. City of Kan.
City, 606 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). Of course, reasonable men may
disagree over whether a given proposition is indisputable. Morgan,Judicial Notice,
57 HARV. L. REV. 268, 274-75 (1944).
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JUDICIAL NOTICE
prima facie recognition of the fact,14 and the party opposing the notice can
introduce evidence in rebuttal. 5 Thus, judicial notice does not infringe the
right to trial by jury. 6
B. Scope ofjudicial Notice
Judicial notice has been applied to three distinct situations. First, it
often refers to the process by which courts inform themselves of applicable
law. This process, while best characterized as judicial knowledge obtained
by legal research, traditionally has been viewed as a form of judicial no-
tice. 7 Second, judicial notice often describes the recognition of specific
facts not proved by the litigant which relate to the parties' activities, prop-
erty, businesses, or which are otherwise necessary to intelligently resolve the
controversy.'" Facts in this category are those that normally go to the jury
and to which the law is applied in the process of adjudication. 9 They are
called adjudicative facts. Third, judicial notice has been applied to the pro-
cess by which courts take social, political, and economic realities into ac-
count. Facts in this category, "which have relevance to legal reasoning and
the lawmaking process," 20 are called legislative facts and often are more
opinion than indisputable fact.
14. English v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 426 S.W.2d 33, 41 (Mo. 1968); Timson v.
Manufacturers' Coal & Coke Co., 220 Mo. 580, 597, 119 S.W. 565, 569 (1909); State
v. Burley, 523 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
15. Morrison v. Thomas, 481 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). See, e.g,
State v. Burley, 523 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); see also English v. Old
Am. Ins. Co., 426 S.W.2d 33, 41 (Mo. 1968); Jackson v. Cherokee Drug Co., 434
S.W.2d 257, 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968). The lack of an opportunity to refute judi-
cially noticed facts has been the basis of reversals, e.g., Knorp v. Thompson, 352
Mo. 44, 47, 175 S.W.2d 889, 894 (1943), and appellate refusals to notice facts not
brought to the trial court's attention. E.g., Morrison v. Thomas, 481 S.W.2d 605,
607 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
16. See Comment, The Presenty Expanding Concept ofJudicial Notice, 13 VILL. L.
REV. 528, 542 (1968). The problem is more serious in jurisdictions where judicially
noticed facts are indisputable. Id Although the question rarely arises, judicial no-
tice of facts adverse to a criminal defendant arguably violates the right to confront
witnesses. See United States v. Alvarado, 519 F.2d 1133, 1135 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976); see also State v. Berry, 609 S.W.2d 948, 955 (Mo. 1980);
cf Knorp v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 44, 52, 175 S.W.2d 889, 894 (1943) (judicial notice
on appeal deprives parties of right to confront and to cross-examine witnesses). But
cf. State v. Brooks, 551 S.W.2d 634, 652-53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (reading transcript
did not deny right of confrontation), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1017 (1978).
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II. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS
A. Genera4ly
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a "judicially noticed fact
must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (I) gener-
ally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, or (2) capa-
ble of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."2 1 Many Missouri cases refer to
similar criteria and emphasize the notoriety of the fact in question.2 2 In
Missouri, facts judicially noticed are disputable; 23 unlike federal law, indis-
putability is not an essential prerequisite to notice of adjudicative facts.24
The majority of Missouri cases that notice adjudicative facts, however, do
not specifically state whether notice is premised on general knowledge or
ready and accurate determination.
Missouri courts have indicated a willingness to take judicial notice (ju-
dicial knowledge and common knowledge2" are encompased within the
term judicial notice26 ) of facts that are commonly known to the general
public.2 Universal knowledge is not required and probably not possible.
Facts known only to the judge or to a small group of people, however, are
not appropriate for judicial notice. 28
Notice also may be taken of facts that are beyond the actual knowledge
21. FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
22. See, e.g., English v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 426 S.W.2d 33, 40-41 (Mo. 1968).
23. Timson v. Manufacturers' Coal & Coke Co., 220 Mo. 580, 598, 119 S.W.
565, 569 (1909) (en banc).
24. Scheufler v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 886, 896, 169 S.W.2d 359,
365 (1943).
25. Borden Co. v. Thomason, 353 S.W.2d 735, 766 (Mo. 1962) (en banc).
26. See Bone v. General Motors Corp., 322 S.W.2d 916, 924 (Mo. 1959).
27. See ABC Liquidators v. Kansas City, 322 S.W.2d 876, 884 (Mo. 1959);
State v. Burley, 523 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). "The basic operative
condition ofjudicial notice is the notoriety of the fact to be noticed. It must be part
of the common knowledge of every person of ordinary understanding and intelli-
gence; only then does it become proper to assume the existence of that fact without
proof." Endicott v. St. Regis Inv. Co., 443 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Mo. 1969) (quoting
English v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 426 S.W.2d 33, 40-41 (Mo. 1968)). See also Elder v.
Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 838, 269 S.W.2d 17, 19 (1954) (en banc). But cf. Rockenstein
v. Rogers, 326 Mo. 468, 31 S.W.2d 792 (1930) (notice premised on "almost common
knowledge").
28. Judicial notice must be declined if there is doubt as to the notoriety of the
fact. Endicott v. St. Regis Inv. Co., 443 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Mo. 1969). See also State
v. Dauit, 343 Mo. 1151, 1159, 125 S.W.2d 47, 52 (1939) (refusal to take notice of
attorney's professional reputation). In "its broad sense, judicial notice operates not
only as to things commonly known, but also to things courts are deemed to know by
virtue of their office." Mince v. Mince, 481 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
See, e.g., Canada v. State, 505 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Mo. 1974) (court relied upon its per-
sonal knowledge of counsel's experience).
[Vol. 48
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 4 [1983], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss4/2
JUDICIAL NOTICE
of the judge if they are ascertainable by reference to reliable authoritative
sources.29 When a court takes judicial notice of facts not actually known,3"
the judge may determine the information as he or she pleases.3 1
B. Mechanics ofjudicially Noticing Adjudicative Facts
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a court may take judicial
notice on its own motion and shall take judicial notice if requested by a
party supplying the necessary information. 32 Some Missouri cases state
that counsel must request that the court take judicial notice33 and that the
29. Felden v. Horton & Coleman, 234 Mo. App. 421, 424, 135 S.W.2d 1115,
1117 (1939). See also Cupples Hesse Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 329 S.W.2d 696,
700-01 (Mo. 1959) (courts cannot create technical knowledge in the first instance by
reference to publications, but refreshing recollection or verifying matter by refer-
ence to dictionaries or encyclopedias is permissible); Langton v. Brown, 591 S.W.2d
84, 87-88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (whether judicial notice should be taken of medical
dictionary definition). Compare City of St. Louis v. Niehaus, 236 Mo. 8, 17, 139
S.W. 450, 452 (1911) (notice may be taken of facts generally known and duly au-
thenticated in repositories of fact open to all) with Timson v. Manufacturers' Coal
& Coke Co., 220 Mo. 580, 596, 119 S.W. 565, 569 (1909) (courts may not notice
"facts merely because they may be ascertained by reference to dictionaries, encyclo-
pedias, or other publications, nor of facts which the court cannot know without
resort to expert testimony or other proof").
30. Matters of which the court is ignorant must be called to its attention by the
litigant before they may be noticed. Christy v. Wabash Ry., 195 Mo. App. 232,
241-42, 191 S.W. 241, 245 (1916), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 656 (1918). See Comment,
supra note 1, at 77.
31. Judges and jurors must rely on knowledge acquired outside the judicial
process. A case cannot be constructed from scratch, and no step toward a reasoned
conclusion "can be taken without assuming something which has not been proved."
J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 279
(1898). See also FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee note. Judge and jury possess
the basic information known to the public at large, and they are encouraged to rely
on experience and common sense in drawing conclusions. See Bone v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 322 S.W.2d 916, 924 (Mo. 1959); Miller v. Sabinske, 322 S.W.2d 941,
947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). Difficulty arises when the trier of fact has knowledge
acquired only as an individual observer outside of court. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note
1, § 2569. Historically, judges could not use personal knowledge. See Scheufler v.
Continental Life Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 886, 895, 169 S.W.2d 359, 365 (1943); Note,
Judicial Notice and Personal Knowledge, 42 MOD. L. REV. 22 (1979). Jurors, however,
freely used their private knowledge. J. THAYER, supra, at 277. Today, neither
judges or jurors are allowed to use knowledge obtained outside evidentiary chan-
nels. The extrajudicial knowledge of a judge does not obviate the necessity of prov-
ing facts which cannot be judicially noticed. H- v. D-, 373 S.W.2d 646, 655
(Mo. Ct. App. 1963). A court will not, however, notice facts directly contrary to its
personal knowledge. Harris v. Lane, 379 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
32. FED. R. EVID. 201(c), (d).
33. See, e.g., Hogan v. Buerger, 647 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State
1983]
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facts must be offered into evidence.3 4 The fact in question must be rele-
vant,3 5 but relevance does not bind a court to take judicial notice; the deci-
sion rests in the discretion of the court.36
Whether the court takes notice depends on the nature of the subject,
the issue involved, and the justice of the case. 37 Courts ordinarily will not
notice the facts and records in one proceeding in deciding a different pro-
ceeding because cases should not be decided on the basis of evidence which
parties have no opportunity to refute, impeach, or explain.38 Conversely, it
has been suggested that a court is required to take judicial notice of its own
records,39 of mortality tables,4 ° and of current historical, geographical, and
scientific facts4 because such facts are commonly known to all mankind.4 2
Some cases state that courts must notice such facts on their own motion; a
request by a litigant is not required.43
The federal rules provide that a party is entitled upon timely request to
an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and
to the tenor of the matter noticed.44 Similarly, some Missouri cases suggest
that the proper procedure is to call the matters to be noticed to the atten-
tion of the court during trial; this gives opposing counsel an opportunity to
offer rebuttal evidence.45 The right to offer rebuttal evidence is distinct
from the opportunity to complain of the propriety of taking judicial notice.
Since Missouri law affords only prima facie recognition to adjudicative facts
v. Cullen, 646 S.W.2d 850, 855 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Kansas City v. Dugan, 524
S.W.2d 194, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
34. See, e.g., Randall v. St. Albans Farms, Inc., 345 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Mo.
1961).
35. Anderson v. Knobbe, 504 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Mo. 1974).
36. See State v. Kelly, 539 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Mo. 1976) (en banc); City of St.
Louis v. Niehaus, 236 Mo. 8, 16-17, 139 S.W. 450, 452 (1911).
37. State v. Kelly, 539 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Mo. 1976) (en banc); State ex rel. F.T.
O'Dell Constr. Co. v. Hostetter, 340 Mo. 1155, 1163, 104 S.W.2d 671, 675 (1937);
City of St. Louis v. Niehaus, 236 Mo. 8, 17, 139 S.W. 450, 452 (1911); see generall'
Mo. BAR C.L.E., supra note 1, §§ 7.3-7.5.
38. Knorp v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 44, 47, 175 S.W.2d 889, 891 (1943). See, e.g.,
Drew v. Littler, 637 S.W.2d 772, 777-78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Mince v. Mince, 481
S.W.2d 610, 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
39. See Hardin v. Hardin, 512 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). This rule
applies whether or not a party suggests notice. Id
40. See Jackson v. Cherokee Drug Co., 434 S.W.2d 257, 264 (Mo. Ct. App.
1968).
41. See State v. Buckley, 318 Mo. 17, 26, 298 S.W. 777, 781 (1927).
42. Bowman v. Kansas City, 361 Mo. 14, 21, 233 S.W.2d 26, 30 (1950) (en
banc).
43. See, e.g., Hardin v. Hardin, 512 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974);
Stimage v. Union Elec. Co., 465 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
44. FED. R. EvID. 201(e).
45. See, e.g., Knorp v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 44, 47, 175 S.W.2d 889, 894 (1943);
Jackson v. Cherokee Drug Co., 434 S.W.2d 257, 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
[Vol. 48
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judicially noticed,4 6 the opposing party has a right to offer rebuttal evi-
dence,4 7 and many cases focus on providing this opportunity.
When a trial court takes judicial notice, a chance to be heard on pro-
priety and in rebuttal ordinarily is available. If judicial notice is taken on
appeal, however, the party opposing notice may be deprived of both oppor-
tunities.4" Problems are minimal when an appellate court takes judicial
notice of facts that a jury might have found from the evidence or of matters
within the jurors' experience which they could properly have relied on in
reaching a decision. 49 Counsel can be said to have had an opportunity to
offer evidence to refute the adversary's evidence or to rebut presumptions or
assumptions. When notice is taken of facts which could not have been
found from evidence introduced at trial, however, fairness requires that op-
posing counsel be granted an opportunity to be heard before judicial notice
is taken, whether during trial, after closing argument,50 or on appeal. 5 '
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits judicial notice at any stage of
proceedings52 and contemplates that judicial notice may be taken at trial or
on appeal. Missouri cases are in accord with this rule.53 Occasionally, how-
ever, an appellate court will suggest that notice on appeal is improper. A
Missouri court of appeals recently refused to judicially notice a stopping
distance when the defendant made no request for notice at trial. The court
indicated that taking notice on appeal would deprive the party opposing
the request of an opportunity to offer rebuttal evidence. The court empha-
sized, however, that it was being asked to find that the plaintiff's claim that
he was obeying the speed limit was factually impossible because of a judi-
cially cognizable stopping distance. 54 Because it viewed defendant's request
as inconsistent with the inherently inconclusive nature of judicial notice in
46. See text accompanying note 15 supra. Geographic facts noticed to prove
venue are ordinarily indisputable, so the problems of noticing them after the close
of the evidence are minimized. See, e.g., State v. Bird, 358 Mo. 284, 286, 214 S.W.2d
38, 40 (1948).
47. Morrison v. Thomas, 481 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
48. See, e.g., Morrison v. Thomas, 481 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
There is no current Missouri law regarding notifying the opposing party of the
court's intention to judicially notice a matter. "Consequently, the opposing party is
not given a reasonable opportunity to present information relevant to the propriety
of taking judicial notice of the matter in question." Mo. BAR C.L.E., supra note 1,
§ 7.12.
49. Stimage v. Union Elec. Co., 465 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
50. See, e.g., Jackson v. Cherokee Drug Co., 434 S.W.2d 257, 264 (Mo. Ct. App.
1968).
51. See Mo. L. REV., supra note 2, at 682.
52. FED. R. EVID. 201(f). But see United States v. Jones, 580 F.2d 219, 222-24
(6th Cir. 1978) (notice on appeal violates Rule 201(g)).
53. See Mo. L. REV., supra note 2, at 682-83.
54. Morrison v. Thomas, 481 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
1983]
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Missouri,5 5 the decision does not suggest that notice on appeal is inevitably
improper; it merely reinforces the Missouri practice that judicially noticed
facts are only prima facie evidence.
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 states that "in a civil action or proceed-
ing, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judi-
cially noticed. In a criminal case the court shall instruct the jury that it
may accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed."5 6 The Missouri Ap-
proved Instructions do not address this problem.5 7
C. Adjudicative Facts Judicially Noticed
1. Geography, History, and Statistics
Notice has been taken of a variety of geographical facts,58 including
facts relating to surveying practices,59 lakes, ° and rivers.6 1 All kinds of lo-
cations and distances have been noticed,62 including the boundaries6 3 and
locations of counties,' the location of places within a particular city,6 5
county,66 or the state, 67 and the locations of highways, 68 airports,69 cities,
7 °
55. Id.
56. FED. R. EvID. 201(g).
57. No instruction may unduly emphasize physical facts. Mo. APPROVED IN-
STR. No. 1.05 (3d ed. 1981). Although the precise meaning of "physical facts" is
unclear, the rule has been termed "a jumble of catchily characterized manifesta-
tions of the law ofjudicial notice." Hoffman, The Probative Force of 'Physical Facts" in
MissouriJurisprudence, 47 Mo. L. REv. 369, 383 (1982).
58. State v. Berger, 618 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). See also Reine-
man v. Larkin, 222 Mo. 156, 170, 121 S.W. 307, 311 (1909) (courts are required to
notice geographic facts).
59. See Harvedt v. Harpst, 173 S.W.2d 65, 69-70 (Mo. 1943); City of Marsh-
field v. Haggard, 304 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957); Vanderhoff v. Law-
rence, 201 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Mo. Ct. App.), af'd, 208 S.W.2d 569 (1947).
60. See Turpin v. Watts, 607 S.W.2d 895, 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
61. See Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 842, 269 S.W.2d 17, 23 (1954) (en banc);
Hartvedt v. Harpst, 173 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Mo. 1943).
62. See State v. Heissler, 324 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Mo. 1959); State v. Berger, 618
S.W.2d 215, 218 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Vincent, 582 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979).
63. See Keaton v. Hamilton, 264 Mo. 564, 573, 175 S.W. 967, 969 (1915); State
v. Skibiski, 245 Mo. 459, 465, 150 S.W. 1038, 1039 (1912).
64. See State v. Berger, 618 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
65. See Eichelberger v. State, 524 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); see also
Opponents, Etc. v. Petitioners For Form., Etc., 564 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978) (municipalities located within townships of the same name).
66. See State v. Sockel, 485 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Mo. 1972); State v. Langston, 382
S.W.2d 612, 615 (Mo. 1964); State v. Bird, 358 Mo. 284, 288, 214 S.W.2d 38, 39
(1948); State v. Kenyon, 343 Mo. 1168, 1183, 126 S.W.2d 245, 252 (1938); State v.
Skibiski, 245 Mo. 459, 465, 150 S.W. 1038, 1039-40 (1912); Butler County Fin. Co.
v. Miller, 240 Mo. App. 954, 958, 225 S.W.2d 135, 137 (1949); ef. Boyd-Richardson
[Vol. 48
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 4 [1983], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss4/2
JUDICIAL NOTICE
and towns.71 Notice regularly is taken of state highway maps72 and infor-
mation that may be gained from them,73 including the location of high-
ways74 and communities,7 5 distances on roads,76 and distances between
points within77 and without the state. 78 Although United States highways
have been noticed as public highways, 79 Missouri courts generally will not
take judicial notice of whether particular streets are within the boundaries
of cities.80
Judicial notice has been taken of important historical facts,"' such as
Co. v. Leachman, 615 S.W.2d 46, 52 (Mo. 1981) (en banc) (characterizing State ex
rel. McClellan v. Godfrey, 519 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Mo. 1975) (en banc) as taking judicial
notice that St. Louis is the only city not located in a county). These facts are usu-
ally noticed to establish venue.
67. See State v. Valentine, 506 S.W.2d 406, 410 (Mo. 1974); State v. Cobb, 359
Mo. 373, 379, 221 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1949); State v. Pennington, 124 Mo. 388, 392,
27 S.W. 1106, 1107 (1894); State v. Hines, 645 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
68. See State v. Sockel, 485 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Mo. 1972).
69. See State v. Boyd, 492 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Mo.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1069
(1973).
70. See State v. Valentine, 506 S.W.2d 406, 410 (Mo. 1974); State v. Johnson,
461 S.W.2d 724, 725 (Mo. 1971); State v. Twiggs, 553 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977).
71. See State v. Chamberlain, 648 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Walsh
v. Table Rock Asphalt Constr. Co., 522 S.W.2d 116, 118 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
72. See, e.g., State v. Heissler, 324 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Mo. 1959); State v. Vin-
cent, 582 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
73. See State v. Cooper, 563 S.W.2d 784, 786 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
74. See State v. Heissler, 324 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Mo. 1959); State v. Quillan, 570
S.W.2d 767, 769 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); see also State v. Cooper, 563 S.W.2d 784, 786
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (most practical highway route).
75. See In re Village of Lone Jack, 419 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Mo. 1967) (en banc).
76. See State v. Ruckman, 222 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Mo. 1949); State v. Martin, 349
Mo. 639, 643, 162 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1942).
77. State v. Enochs, 339 Mo. 953, 956, 98 S.W.2d 685, 686 (1936). See, e.g.,
State v. Chamberlain, 648 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Dennis,
537 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); see also State v. Berger, 618 S.W.2d 215,
218 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (it is not three times further from the town of Buffalo to
the Webster County jail than it is from Buffalo to the Polk County jail).
78. See Hogan v. Buerger, 647 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
79. See State v. Hanson, 493 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Barker,
490 S.W.2d 263, 270 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
80. See Bennett v. Kitczhin, 400 S.W.2d 97, 106 (Mo. 1966); Kieffer v. City of
Berkeley, 508 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). But see State v. Vincent, 582
S.W.2d 723, 725 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (official highway map of Missouri indicated
that street was located entirely within the boundaries of St. Louis).
81. See Rositzky v. Rositzky, 329 Mo. 662, 679, 46 S.W.2d 591, 599 (1931)
(Iowa and Missouri were part of the Louisiana Purchase). Notice of historical facts
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the warfare along the Kansas-Missouri border during the Civil War,8" can-
didates for public office,83 and prevailing economic conditions. 84
Appellate courts have taken judicial notice of mortality tables, 85 units
of weight and measure,86 the time of sunrise 87 and sunset,88 facts relating to
the calendar,8 9 including the date on which a particular day of the week
falls,90 and the significance of particular holidays.9 ' Notice is taken of facts
82. Doneghy v. Robinson, 210 S.W. 655, 656 (Mo. 1918). See, e.g., Douthitt v.
Stinson, 63 Mo. 268, 275 (1876) (Missouri was not a Confederate state); Gross v.
Merchants-Produce Bank, 390 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (between 1845
and 1873 Kansas City grew to be the metropolis of Jackson County). But see State
v. Kelly, 539 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Mo. 1976) (en banc) (trial court upheld in refusing
to notice information in coin book that no silver dollars were minted in 1819 or
1829).
83. See State ex rel. Crow v. Bland, 144 Mo. 534, 552, 46 S.W. 440, 443 (1898).
84. See, e.g., Stateexrel. Crutcher v. Koeln, 332 Mo. 1229, 1231, 61 S.W.2d 750,
756 (1933) (en banc); Title Guaranty Trust Co. v. Sessinghaus, 325 Mo. 420, 422,
28 S.W.2d 1001, 1006 (1930); Covey v. Pierce, 229 Mo. App. 424, 430, 82 S.W.2d
592, 596 (1935) (per curiam). The courts frequently notice matters of current his-
tory. See, e.g., State v. Buckley, 318 Mo. 17, 26, 298 S.W. 777, 781 (1927); Turpin v.
Watts, 607 S.W.2d 895, 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Moulder v. Webb, 527 S.W.2d
417, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). The distinction between current history and other
historical facts has not been articulated.
85. See Leh v. Dyer, 643 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Jackson v. Chero-
kee Drug Co., 434 S.W.2d 257, 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968). Although notice of them
is required, these tables may be rebutted. Leh v. Dyer, 643 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982). See also Hohlstein v. St. Louis Roofing Co., 328 Mo. 899, 904, 42
S.W.2d 573, 576 (1931).
86. See State v. Consiglia, 435 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); see also
State v. Nierstheimer, 500 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Carwile,
441 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
87. See State v. Selle, 367 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Mo. 1963); State v. Perkins, 342
Mo. 560, 565, 116 S.W.2d 80, 83 (1938).
88. See, e.g., State v. Powell, 306 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Mo. 1957); State v. Simler,
350 Mo. 646, 650, 167 S.W.2d 376, 379 (1943); State v. Gallimore, 633 S.W.2d 232,
233 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Larreu v. Ozark Water Ski Thrill Show, 562 S.W.2d 790,
792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Leek v. Dillard, 304 S.W.2d 60, 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).
89. See State v. Schmitz, 46 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Mo. 1932). Calendars and dates
are frequently noticed in the context of determining whether limitations have run,
particularly to determine whether a day fell on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holi-
day. See State v. Bubenyak, 331 Mo. 549, 552, 56 S.W.2d 43, 44 (1932); Kuczma v.
Droskowski, 243 Mo. 57, 60, 147 S.W. 1000, 1001 (1912); Meriwether v. Overly, 228
Mo. 218, 233-34, 129 S.W. 1, 6 (1910); State v. Barber, 573 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978); Haller v. Shaw, 555 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); State v.
Gantt, 504 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
90. See State v. Bubenyak, 351 Mo. 549, 552, 56 S.W.2d 43, 44 (1932); State v.
Schmitz, 46 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Mo. 1932); Hoffman v. Bagham, 324 Mo. 516, 524-
25, 24 S.W.2d 125, 130 (1930); State v. Rainwater, 602 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Mo. Ct.
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about population,9 2 including the approximate and exact population of
counties,9 cities,9a and towns.9 5
2. Science, Engineering, and Medicine
Missouri courts also take judicial notice of the laws of nature,96 the
characteristics of domestic animals,97 and of prevalent weather condi-
tions.98 Courts have noticed that downdrafts affect aircraft, 99 that wood
rots,' 00 and that a black surface will reflect less light than a light surface.'
01
Judicial knowledge of natural phenomena is limited to those that are com-
App. 1980); Hailer v. Shaw, 555 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Hagen v.
Perryville Bd. of Alderman, 550 S.W.2d 797, 798-99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
91. See Edwards v. Business Men's Assurance Co., 350 Mo. 666, 678-79, 168
S.W.2d 82, 88 (1942); City of Gladstone v. Knapp, 458 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1970).
92. See, e.g., Hydesburg Common School Dist. v. Renssalaer Common School
Dist., 218 S.W.2d 833, 841 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949) (population of rural and urban
areas is constantly shifting).
93. See State v. Hull, 603 S.W.2d 698, 704 (Mo. 1980); State v. Odor, 369
S.W.2d 173, 179 (Mo. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993 (1964); State v. Wilcox, 44
S.W.2d 85, 86-87 (Mo. 1931); State v. Hancock, 320 Mo. 254, 256, 75 S.W.2d 275,
276 (1928); State v. Adams, 316 Mo. 157, 159, 289 S.W. 948, 952 (1926); State v.
Logan, 268 Mo. 169, 175, 186 S.W. 979, 980 (1916).
94. See, e.g., State ex re. McClellan v. Godfrey, 519 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Mo. 1975) (en
banc); Newdiger v. Kansas City, 342 Mo. 252, 264, 114 S.W.2d 1047, 1053 (1937);
State v. Lloyd, 320 Mo. 236, 244, 7 S.W.2d 344, 346 (1926); State v. Page, 107 Mo.
App. 213, 215-16, 80 S.W. 912, 913 (1904).
95. See State v. McBrien, 205 Mo. 594, 609, 178 S.W. 489, 493 (1915).
96. See, e.g., Valley Spring Hog Ranch Co. v. Plagmann, 282 Mo. 1, 19, 220
S.W. 1, 3 (1920) (en banc) (house flies spread germs); La Plant v. DuPont, 346
S.W.2d 231, 237 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (nitrates form when weeds die).
97. See Lloyd v. Alton Ry., 348 Mo. 1222, 1230, 159 S.W.2d 267, 272 (1942);
Mitchell v. Newson, 360 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962); see also Brune v.
DeBenedetto, 261 S.W. 930, 933 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924); Roy v. Noell Kan. City Dev.
Co., 226 S.W. 965, 966 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920) (mules prone to kick). But see Denny v.
City of Puxico, 4 S.W.2d 475, 476 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928) (court would not notice that
a horse might stumble 40 feet before falling).
98. See Aeby v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 313 Mo. 492, 511, 285 S.W. 965, 970 (1926),
rev'don other grounds, 275 U.S. 426 (1928); Armstrong v. City of Monett, 228 S.W.
771, 775 (Mo. 1921); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Terrell, 410 S.W.2d 356, 359-60 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1966); Behm v. King Louie's Bowl, 350 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961);
Hurley v. Illinois Central R.R., 221 Mo. App. 478, 482, 282 S.W. 97, 99 (1926); cf
State v. Sinovitch, 329 Mo. 909, 914, 46 S.W.2d 877, 879 (1932) (overcoats are in
general use in Missouri during February). But see State v. Howard, 242 Mo. 432,
438, 147 S.W.95, 96 (1912) (court cannot judicially notice presence of clouds at a
given time).
99. See Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, 363 Mo. 922, 930, 254 S.W.2d 662,
667 (1953) (en banc).
100. See Newton v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 222 Mo. 375, 394, 121 S.W. 125, 131
1983]
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monly known; unique or obscure matters will not be noticed without
evidence. 102
Missouri courts must notice scientific facts 10 3 that are matters of com-
mon knowledge 10 4 and may notice scientific facts that are ascertainable by
reference to a standard encyclopedia.10 5 Notice has been taken that the
telephone is essential to the safety, comfort, convenience, and social welfare
of all people, 0 6 and that sewage disposal plants are essential to public
health.'0 7 It has been said to be common knowledge that an electric light
bulb will generate heat10 8 and will burn out at unpredictable moments,'
0 9
and that 69,000 volts of electricity can be lethal." 0 Judicial notice has been
taken that an automobile speedometer reflects approximate speed, though
considerable variance exists in the speedometers of different cars, 111 that
radar speedometers measure speed in miles per hour, 112 and that such de-
vices may not always operate accurately." 3 It has been said to be common
knowledge that a fire may be started in combustible materials that are com-
(1909) (but court could not infer that wood used in blocking a switch on a track will
rot between October and following August).
101. See Zickefoose v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 579, 590, 148 S.W.2d 784, 789 (1941).
102. See State v. Buckley, 318 Mo. 19, 27, 298 S.W. 777, 781 (1927).
103. Id at 26, 298 S.W. at 781; State v. Stavricos, 506 S.W.2d 51, 57 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1974).
104. Valley Spring Hog Ranch Co. v. Plagmann, 282 Mo. 1, 10, 220 S.W. 1, 3
(1920); Timson v. Manufacturers' Coal & Coke Co., 220 Mo. 580, 591, 119 S.W.
565, 569 (1909); State v. Stavricos, 506 S.W.2d 51, 57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); State v.
Summers, 489 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
105. Felden v. Horton & Coleman, Inc., 234 Mo. App. 421, 424, 135 S.W.2d
1115, 1117 (1939).
106. See State ex rel City of Lebanon v. Missouri Standard Tel. Co., 337 Mo.
642, 656, 85 S.W.2d 613, 620 (1935) (en banc). See also Hale v. Texas County, 178
S.W. 865, 865 (Mo. 1915) (telephone a necessity to probate judge).
107. See State ex rel Schwab v. Riley, 417 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. 1967) (en banc).
108. See Furlong v. Stokes, 427 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1968).
109. See Hopkins v. Sefton Fibre Can Co., 390 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Mo. Ct. App.
1965).
110. See Kamo Elec. Coop. v. Cushard, 416 S.W.2d 646, 658 (Mo. Ct. App.
1967).
111. See State v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
112. See City of St. Louis v. Boecker, 370 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963)
(per curiam); State v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188, 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). Compare
State v. Smith, 637 S.W.2d 232, 237 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (suggests that appellate
opinions have noticed the basis of neutron activation analysis) with Arnold v. Direc-
tor of Revenue, 593 S.W.2d 624, 625-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (court could not judi-
cially notice operative requirements of breathalyzers).
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pressed or moist and that such a fire will smolder before flaming,1 14 that
gasoline is explosive when exposed to flame or spark, 1 5 and that liquified
petroleum gas is combustible."
16
Courts have taken notice that an object moving over a surface in a
straight line will continue to move unless compelled by force to change di-
rection." 7 Less commonly known facts have been noticed, including that
cement contains lime, 81 8 that propane is heavier than air, 119 and that mor-
phine is a derivative of opium.'2 ' The courts have refused to notice that
lead balls are used exclusively in twenty-two caliber rifles, that a shot from
such a rifle will make a hole in a man's skull larger than the diameter of the
ball,' 2 ' that a lead bullet fired from a pistol may not be deflected upon
striking a human,' 22 or that all coal mines generate deleterious gas.'
23
Missouri courts will notice medical practices, 124 as well as scientific
knowledge accepted by the medical profession.' 25 A court is justified in
taking judicial knowledge of the reliability and value of properly performed
blood tests.' 26 Notice has been taken that serum blood tests cannot show
that a person is the father of a child, but they can establish that he is not. 1
27
The laws of hygiene' 28 and other medical facts are held to be common
knowledge: that blood pressure may rise from pain, emotion, fright, and
many other things,' 29 that heart disease afflicts people in all walks of life,
particularly in middle and advanced age, 130 that the limbosacral is a part
114. See Superior Ice & Coal Co. v. Belger Cartage Serv., 337 S.W.2d 897, 906
(Mo. 1960).
115. See Carter v. Skelly Oil Co., 363 Mo. 570, 573, 252 S.W.2d 306, 307 (1952).
116. See Grissom v. Handley, 410 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
117. See Prince v. Bennett, 322 S.W.2d 886, 890 (Mo. 1959).
118. See Baker v. Stewart Sand & Material Co., 353 S.W.2d 108, 112 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1961).
119. See Grissom v. Handley, 410 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
120. See State v. Stavricos, 506 S.W.2d 51, 57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
121. See State v. Buckley, 318 Mo. 17, 27, 298 S.W. 777, 781 (1927). But c.f.
State v. Smith, 329 Mo. 272, 278, 44 S.W.2d 45, 48 (1931) (bullet would penetrate a
human body to a considerable depth unless it struck thick bone).
122. See State v. Baker, 324 Mo. 846, 850, 24 S.W.2d 1039, 1040 (1930).
123. See Timson v. Manufacturers' Coal & Coke Co., 220 Mo. 580, 596, 119
S.W. 565, 568-69 (1909).
124. Rossomanno v. LaClede Cab Co., 328 S.W.2d 677, 682 n.1 (Mo. 1959) (en
banc).
125. State v. Buckley, 318 Mo. 17, 26, 298 S.W. 777, 781 (1927); State v. Sum-
mers, 489 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
126. State v. Summers, 489 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
127. Id
128. See Valley Spring Hog Ranch Co. v. Plagmann, 282 Mo. 1, 10, 220 S.W. 1,
3 (1920) (en banc).
129. See Scott v. Missouri Ins. Co., 222 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949),
af'd, 361 Mo. 51, 233 S.W.2d 660 (1950) (en banc).
130. See Liebrum v. Laclede Gas Co., 419 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
1983]
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of the back and spine and that a disc is part of the spine,' 3 1 that people
need medical attention, 32 and that tonsils are not removed unless they are
infected. 133 It has been noticed that normal human beings shrink from
death,'3 4 that an excessive amount of whiskey stupifies the senses and ren-
ders physical powers impotent, 135 that a body member completely severed
is lost forever, 136 that insanity may be transient, 137 that a person may be
unconscious one moment and conscious the next,1 38 and that a person
thirty-five years old with no diseases or abnormalities may be expected to
live a substantial number of years.' 3
9
It has been said to be common knowledge that foreign substances
should not be lodged in an eye except as directed by a doctor, 40 that man-
ual labor by persons whose physical condition is below normal would be
harmful but not necessarily dangerous,' 4' that the way a layman usually
determines that he has a specific disease affecting an internal organ is to be
so advised by a doctor, 142 and that involuntary civil commitment is stigma-
tizing.' 43 Notice has also been taken that the normal human gestation pe-
riod is 280 days,'" that 229 days is not medically impossible, 145 and that
miscarriages occur among pregnant women for many reasons, known and
131. See Pope v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 341 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Mo. 1960); see
also Rockenstein v. Rogers, 326 Mo. 468, 487, 31 S.W.2d 792, 801 (1930) (sacroiliac
joint is a part of the back).
132. See Thornsberry v. State Dept. of Pub. Health & Welfare, 285 S.W.2d 77,
86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955), rev'don other grounds, 365 Mo. 1217, 295 S.W.2d 372 (1956)
(en banc).
133. See Carroll v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 231 Mo. App. 265, 271, 96
S.W.2d 1074, 1078 (1936).
134. See Edwards v. Business Men's Assurance Co., 350 Mo. 666, 680, 168
S.W.2d 82, 90 (1942); Griffith v. Continental Casualty Co., 299 Mo. 426, 445-46,
253 S.W. 1043, 1048 (1923) (en banc); Cope v. Thompson, 534 S.W.2d 641, 648 n.3
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
135. See State v. Rowe, 324 Mo. 863, 874, 24 S.W.2d 1032, 1038 (1930).
136. See Buillot v. Income Guar. Co., 231 Mo. App. 531, 544, 102 S.W.2d 132,
140 (1937).
137. See Forbis v. Forbis, 274 S.W.2d 800, 805 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955).
138. See Whiteacre v. Kelly, 345 Mo. 489, 495, 134 S.W.2d 121, 124 (1939).
139. See Bone v. General Motors Corp., 322 S.W.2d 916, 924 (Mo. 1959).
140. See Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859, 867 (Mo. 1958) (en banc).
141. See Hamm v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 237 Mo. App. 12, 26, 166 S.W.2d
324, 332 (1942). But see Cole v. Best Motor Lines, 303 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1957) (court would not notice that man with a 10% disability could not
change tractor tire).
142. See Baugh Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 307 S.W.2d 660, 666 (Mo. 1957); see
also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 70 F.2d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 1934) (layman cannot
by superficial perception determine if he has arteriosclerosis).
143. See Stateexrel. D.W. v. Hensley, 574 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Mo. 1978) (en banc)
(Seiler, J., dissenting).
144. See State v. Drummins, 274 Mo. 632, 642, 204 S.W. 271, 274 (1918); see also
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unknown. 4 6 The courts have refused, however, to notice the range of
weight, length, and general condition of a seven month infant as compared
with a nine month child, or that every seven month baby requires
incubation.147
3. Business, Economics, and Professions
Notice has been taken that physicians frequently maintain offices in
their residences,14 s that hospital bills include charges for medicine, food,
and care, 149 and that medicine and osteopathy are distinct healing arts.' 5 °
In 1927, notice was taken that progress had been made in raising standards
of attainment for doctors and lawyers.'' The courts consistently have re-
fused, however, to notice the reasonableness of medical fees.' 5 2 In 1959, the
Missouri Supreme Court declined to decide whether the courts might notice
that in the regular course of business doctors keep records of their patients'
cases and make entries at or near the time of the event recorded. 1
53
Courts notice permanent changes in social and economic conditions
5 4
as well as facts, trends, and events affecting value.' 55 In 1946, the substan-
tial increase in real estate values from 1937 to 1946 was said to be common
knowledge,' 5 6 and in 1920, it was said to be common knowledge that real
estate prices had recently increased.'-S Judicial notice has been taken of the
In re Marriage of B, 619 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (not every period of
gestation is precisely 280 days).
145. See L.C.F. v. D.H.F., 333 S.W.2d 320, 327 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960). But see
Boudinier v. Boudinier, 240 Mo. App. 278, 294, 203 S.W.2d 89, 98 (1947) (316 days
is too long to warrant judicial notice).
146. See Gulley v. Spinnichia, 341 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
147. See L.C.F. v. D.H.F., 333 S.W.2d 320, 327 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); see also
Pflingsten v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 330 S.W.2d 806, 814-15 (Mo. 1959) (refusal to
notice that insured who allegedly had lung cancer on May 22 was not in good
health on May 16 when life insurance policy was delivered).
148. See State ex rel. Kaegel v. Holekamp, 151 S.W.2d 685, 689 (Mo. Ct. App.
1941).
149. See Karagas v. Union Pac. R.R., 232 S.W. 1100, 1100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1921).
150. See Mitchem v. Perry, 390 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
151. See Horton v. Clark, 316 Mo. 770, 778, 293 S.W. 362, 364 (1927) (en banc).
152. See, e.g., Richard B. Curnow, M.D., Inc. v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607
(Mo. 1981) (en banc).
153. See Rossomanno v. Laclede Cab Co., 328 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Mo. 1959) (en
banc).
154. Hurst v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 280 Mo. 566, 573, 219 S.W. 566, 588 (1920).
155. Simpson v. Spellman, 522 S.W.2d 615, 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
156. See Kuhn v. Zepp, 355 Mo. 295, 303, 196 S.W.2d 249, 253 (1946) (en banc).
157. See Arnold v. Arnold, 332 Mo. 61, 66, 222 S.W. 996, 1000 (1920) (en banc);
see also In re Marriage of Pine, 625 S.W.2d 942, 945 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (almost
common knowledge that given present market for residential real estate, sale of
family home is not possible without substantial loss). But see Berry v. Federal Kem-
19831
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collapse of farmland values during the depression1 58 and of the rental and
market value of real estate generally; 159 conversely, notice was taken of the
fact that a collapse in stock values during the late depression largely was
wiped out by improved economic conditions. 6 ° It has been said to be com-
mon knowledge that communities have used industrial revenue bonds to
attract industry. 6 1 In 1979, it was noticed that the possibility of an oil
embargo had been known for many years.
1 62
The value of money has been said to be well within the knowledge of
the average juror,' 63 as is the effect of inflation.16 4 Notice has been taken of
a decrease in interest rates, 165 and of general facts about value: that mod-
ern household furnishings often exceed $500 in value, 166 that properties
bring reduced prices at forced sales,1 67 that rearing teenagers requires more
than a meager allowance, 1' 6 that new cars have always cost more than
$30,169 and that unforeseen events cause fluctuations in securities prices.' 70
Changes or trends in the market value of real estate, however, are not sub-
jects that permit a reliable generalization or judicial knowledge without evi-
per Ins. Co., 621 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (refusal to notice changes or
trends in market value).
158. See Thompson v. Thompson, 156 S.W.2d 937, 940 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941); see
also Saline County v. Thorp., 337 Mo. 1140, 1145, 88 S.W.2d 183, 185 (1935) (de-
cline in value of farmland).
159. See Krueger v. Licklider, 336 Mo. 1053, 1058, 76 S.W.2d 113, 117 (Mo.
1934); State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Pope, 228 Mo. App. 888, 897, 74
S.W.2d 265, 270 (1934).
160. See Warmack v. Crawford, 239 Mo. App. 709, 717, 195 S.W.2d 919, 923
(1946).
161. See St. Louis County v. Village of Champ, 438 S.W.2d 205, 213 (Mo. 1969)
(en banc).
162. See Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 728
(Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979).
163. See Hold v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 356 Mo. 412, 424, 201 S.W.2d 958, 964
(1947).
164. See, e.g., Kieffer v. Kieffer, 590 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Mo. 1979) (en banc);
Ward v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 379 S.W.2d 614, 620 (Mo. 1964); Marshall v.
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 196 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Mo. 1946); Hurst v. Chicago B. &
Q.R.R., 280 Mo. 566, 573, 219 S.W. 566, 568-69 (1920); Harrison v. Harrison, 606
S.W.2d 234, 235-36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Morris v. Morris, 549 S.W.2d 363, 365
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977). But see Gambino v. Gambino, 636 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982) (judicial notice of inflation "can only go so far").
165. See Gershman Inv. Corp. v. Danforth, 475 S.W.2d 36, 37-38 (Mo. 1971) (en
banc).
166. See In re Polizoe's Estate, 246 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
167. See Hamiltonian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wendling, 199 S.W.2d 29, 37
(Mo. Ct. App. 1947).
168. See Franke v. Franke, 447 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Mo. 1969).
169. See State v. Haney, 284 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Mo. 1955).
170. See A.B. Collins & Co. v. Quentin, 71 S.W.2d 758, 760 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
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dentiary proof; a court will not take judicial notice of the value of a
specific piece of realty,172 the exact value of various goods,1 73 or the reason-
ableness of fees for medical174 and other services involving special skills.175
In 1926, judicial notice was taken that agriculture was Missouri's chief
source of wealth,176 and it has been said to be common knowledge that
hand-picked cotton is more valuable than machine-picked cotton.1 77 No-
tice also has been taken of the nature of certain crops' 78 and their harvest
times. 179
Notice has been taken of facts about bankers,'8 0 banking practices, 81
insurance practices, 8 2 and the rights of insureds. 8 3 It has been said to be
well-known that those who investigate and settle personal injury claims be-
come imbued with prejudice against the validity and extent of those
171. Berry v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 621 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981); Kirst v. Clarkson Constr. Co., 395 S.W.2d 487, 498 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965);
Warmack v. Crawford, 239 Mo. App. 709, 717, 195 S.W.2d 919, 923 (1946). But cf
Cupples Hesse Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 329 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Mo. 1959) (court
"may know" of the increase in building costs from 1937 to 1942).
172. Cummins v. Dixon, 265 S.W.2d 386, 397 (Mo. 1954); De Paige v. Douglas,
234 Mo. 78, 84, 136 S.W. 345, 347 (1911). But see Collector of Revenue v. Parcels of
Land, 362 Mo. 1054, 1067, 247 S.W.2d 83, 91 (1952) (en banc) (noticed assessed
valuations shown in the Journal of the State Board of Equalization).
173. See, e.g., Bybee v. Dixon, 380 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); State v.
E.T. Swiney Motor Co., 244 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951).
174. Richard B. Curnow, M.D., Inc. v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. 1981)
(en banc). But see In re Winschel's Estate, 393 S.W.2d 71, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)
(reasonable value of domestic and nursing services rendered to a deceased is a mat-
ter of common knowledge); Boyher v. Gearhart Estate, 367 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1963) (same).
175. McCardie & Akers Constr. Co. v. Bonney, 647 S.W.2d 193, 194-95 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983) (value of construction work); St. Charles Flour Co. v. Hoelzer, 565
S.W.2d 844, 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (same); Boggess v. Cunningham's Estate, 207
S.W.2d 814, 820 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948) (financial agent's services). But cf. Strauser v.
Estate of Strauser, 573 S.W.2d 423, 424 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (showing of reasonable
value necessary to quantum meruit recovery not necessary where the value of a
particular service is common knowledge).
176. See Jasper County Farm Bureau v. Jasper County, 315 Mo. 560, 566, 286
S.W. 381, 383 (1926).
177. See Moore v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 301 S.W.2d 395, 404 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).
178. See Gipson v. Fisher Bros. Co., 204 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947).
179. See Garth v. Caldwell, 72 Mo. 622, 628 (1880); Plano Mfg. Co. v. Cunning-
ham, 73 Mo. App. 376, 379 (1898). But see Culver v. Worts, 32 Mo. App. 419, 426
(1888) (court would not notice precise date of maturity).
180. See State v. McBrien, 266 Mo. 594, 609, 178 S.W. 489, 493 (1915).
181. See State v. Morro, 313 Mo. 114, 125, 280 S.W. 697, 700 (1926).
182. See Prange v. International Life Ins. Co., 329 Mo. 651, 656, 46 S.W.2d 523,
524 (1931).
183. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Nevils, 217 Mo. App. 630, 639-40, 274
S.W. 503, 506 (1925)
1983]
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claims." 4 Notice has been taken that when property is sold under deferred
payments, sellers protect their interests with insurance, and that the pur-
chasers pay the premiums.18 5 An appellate court noticed that the faces of
insurance policies do not contain the whole contract." 6 A request that a
trial court notice that Allstate was owned by Sears, Roebuck & Co. was
denied. 187
Notice has been taken of the standard gauge of railroad track 8 and
other facts relating to trains. Courts have noticed that locomotives and rail-
road cars are wider than tracks 89 and are interchanged among various car-
riers.' ° In 1960, notice was taken that some efforts had recently been made
to increase train crew numbers. 91 In 1968, notice was taken that the
number of passenger trains operated in Missouri had steadily declined over
the preceding ten years.' 92 It has been said to be common knowledge that
properly operated trains are subject to irregular movement without negli-
gence on anyone's part,' 93 that all trains make noise when operating,' 94 and
that the passage of trains at high speed sets up air currents which whip up
dirt, dust and other debris.' 9 Similarly, it has been noticed that railroad
tracks and yards are beset with embankments, ditches, culverts, and other
184. See Bright v. Sammons, 214 S.W. 425, 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919).
185. See Edwards v. Zahner, 395 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Mo. 1965).
186. See Steinzeig v. Mechanics & Traders Ins. Co., 297 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1957).
187. See Morrow v. Zigaitis, 608 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
188. West v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 295 S.W.2d 48, 52 (Mo. 1956); Lang v. St.
Louis & S.F. Ry., 364 Mo. 1147, 1152, 273 S.W.2d 270, 273 (1954); Hunt v. Chicago
M. St. P. & P. Ry., 359 Mo. 1089, 1094, 225 S.W.2d 738, 740 (1949) (en banc);
Finley v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 251 S.W.2d 713, 724 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
189. See Metton v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 474, 482, 251 S.W.2d 663,
667 (1952) (en banc); Taylor v. Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry., 357 Mo. 1086, 1089, 212
S.W.2d 412, 414 (1948).
190. See Doering v. St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry., 63 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Mo. Ct. App.
1933); see also Markley v. Kansas City So. Ry., 338 Mo. 436, 446, 90 S.W.2d 409,
414 (1936) (railroad records show when each car is delivered, length of service, and
recent use).
191. See Stateex rel Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
335 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Mo. 1960) (en banc).
192. See State ex rel. Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 433
S.W.2d 596, 597-98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968). See also State ex re. Chicago, Rock Island
& Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 312 S.W.2d 791, 803 (Mo. 1958) (en banc)
(development of highways, motor vehicles, and aircraft has curtailed railroad
business).
193. See Dunn v. Alton Ry., 88 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935).
194. See Rhinberger v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 520, 525, 202 S.W.2d 64, 68 (1947)
(en banc).
195. Fitzpatrick v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 300 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Mo. 1957). See
also Cooperative Ass'n No. 37 v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 591 S.W.2d 404, 409 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979) (Titus, J., dissenting) (steam locomotives emit sparks).
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offsets such that it would be impractical to have guardrails to protect em-
ployees,' 96 and that train engineers require reaction time to see dangers and
brake.'9 7 An appellate court refused to take judicial notice of the duties
performed by brakemen' 98 or notice that the boiler on the engine ob-
structed the engineer's view from a point 350 feet from the collision. 1
99
Notice has been taken that a gasoline filling station deals in and stores
highly combustible products.20 ° It has been said to be well-known that cus-
tomers in self-service stores freely exercise the privilege of moving, handling,
and examining items displayed for sale.2 0 ' Similarly, it has been said to be
common knowledge that building owners customarily provide plate-glass
show windows for the display of merchandise, that the owners or their ten-
ants encourage the public to view the items displayed,20 2 that it is the prac-
tice of automobile dealers to permit test driving, 20 3 that several inches of
top soil are included in the sale of sod,20 4 and that cemeteries are not sold
on the open market.20 5
Notice was taken in 1973 that the standard commission in a county on
farmland sales was 5%.206 An appellate court refused, however, to notice
that a product is sold through exclusive franchises, or that a shop is located
within a franchise territory.20 7
Missouri courts will notice facts relating to sports, including the fact
that injury is a normal incident of professional football,20 8 and that golf
196. See Ferguson v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 307 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Mo. 1957) (en
banc), reo'don other grounds, 356 U.S. 41 (1958).
197. See Stark v. Berger, 344 Mo. 170, 175, 125 S.W.2d 870, 872 (1939) (en
banc); McGowan v. Wells, 324 Mo. 652, 656, 24 S.W.2d 633, 639 (1929); Doelling
v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 258 S.W.2d 244, 248 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
198. See Gannaway v. Pitcairn, 109 S.W.2d 78, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937). But see
Talbert v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry., 321 Mo. 1080, 1086, 15 S.W.2d 762, 764 (brake-
men may be obliged to walk on tract to adjust defective couplers), cert. denied, 280
U.S. 567 (1929).
199. See Fitzgerald v. Thompson, 238 Mo. App. 546, 560, 184 S.W.2d 198, 206
(1944); March v. Pitcairn, 125 S.W.2d 972, 974 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939).
200. See Whitehead v. Schrick, 328 S.W.2d 170, 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
201. See Copher v. Barbee, 361 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962).
202. See Leisure v. J.A. Bruening Co., 315 S.W.2d 705, 707-08 (Mo. 1958).
203. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 311 S.W.2d 41, 47
(Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
204. See Miller v. Sabinske, 322 S.W.2d 941, 949 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
205. See State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Mount Moriah Cemetery Ass'n,
434 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Mo. 1968).
206. See Brooks v. Kunz, 637 S.W.2d 135, 141 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
207. See Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Mo. Ct. App.
1955).
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courses require large areas.2"9 The courts generally have refused to notice
facts relating to card games or gambling.21 ° An appellate court refused to
notice that rummy is a game of chance played with cards, 211 and courts
have refused to notice what constitutes a crap table 21 2 or how the game is
played.2 3 Similarly, absent a showing that it is played with cards, the
supreme court refused to notice that poker is a game of chance.21 4
Courts have noticed that janitorial work has become a trade, and that
many concerns contract to have such work done after the day's business. 21 5
It has been said to be common knowledge that many persons engage in
service work as an independent calling or occupation, 2 16 and that no place
of business is as safe from disease and fire as one's own home. 217 Similarly,
notice has been taken of reciprocity agreements regarding nursing
licenses,218 that it is virtually impossible for a sixty-three year-old woman to
find satisfactory employment, 219 and that those who transport property
sometimes protect it by carrying firearms.220 Missouri courts also have no-
ticed the usual course of business of the mails,221 that mail is not delivered
on Christmas,222 that a road contractor was not responsible for the location
of the highway he was building,223 and that many corporations are organ-
209. See Aquamsi Land Co. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 346 Mo. 524, 532, 142
S.W.2d 332, 336 (1940).
210. But cf Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418 (1969) (bookmaking is
often carried out over the telephone); State v. Turlington, 200 Mo. App. 192, 197,
204 S.W. 821, 823 (1918) (many people have a gambling instinct).
211. See State v. Stewart, 228 Mo. App. 187, 191, 63 S.W.2d 210, 213 (1933).
212. See State v. Chaney, 188 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Mo. 1945).
213. See State v. Wade, 267 Mo. 249, 261, 183 S.W. 598, 601 (1916).
214. See State v. Solon, 247 Mo. 672, 682, 153 S.W. 1023, 1025 (1913).
215. See Wooten v. Youthcraft Mfg. Co., 312 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 1958).
216. See Dean v. Young, 396 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Mo. 1965).
217. See City of Wash. v. Mueller, 218 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949).
218. See Toomey v. Toomey, 636 S.W.2d 313, 314 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 730 (1983).
219. See Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); see
also Martin v. Star Cooler Corp., 484 S.W.2d 32, 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (relatively
uneducated and unskilled working man with only part of a hand is at a disadvan-
tage in the labor market); cf Hopkins v. North Am. Co., 594 S.W.2d 310, 315 n.4
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (en banc) (individual may have more than one employment or
occupation).
220. See Arnold v. Wigdor Furniture Co., 281 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Mo. 1955).
221. See McCaskey Register Co. v. Erffmeyer, 46 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Mo. Ct. App.
1932); German-Am. Bank v. Cramery, 184 Mo. App. 481, 482, 171 S.W. 31, 32
(1914). But see Hood v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 379 S.W.2d 806, 811 (Mo. Ct. App.
1964).
222. See Deffendoll v. Stupp Bros. Bridge & Iron Co., 415 S.W.2d 36, 42 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1964). But see Hoelscher v. Sel-Mor Garment Co., 430 S.W.2d 745, 748
(Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (courts will not notice exact time of mail delivery).
223. See Slicer v. W.J. Menefee Constr. Co., 270 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Mo. 1954).
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ized under Delaware law although they do business elsewhere.224 An appel-
late court has refused, however, to notice relations between post offices
regarding routing practices and postal transport,225 or that employers ask
prospective employees if they have arrest records.
2 26
4. Motor Vehicles
Missouri cases have taken judicial notice of facts relating to motor ve-
hicles of all kinds.227 It has been said to be common knowledge that motor
vehicles are deadly and destructive, 228 and that motorists from many parts
of the United States frequently use the principal highways of the various
states.22 9 The courts have noticed that a pickup truck is a motor vehicle,2 3 °
that half-ton pickups are commonly used as passenger vehicles, and that
these trucks bear freight and merchandise. 23 1 Judicial notice has been
taken that traffic noise, particularly from trucks, may be heard for a consid-
erable distance,2 32 but the Missouri Supreme Court refused to notice that
the left rear of a trailer sways to the left when the tractor sways to the
right.2 33 Courts have noticed facts relating to the construction of
automobiles, including that the lights of automobiles of standard height are
about three feet above the ground,23 4 that headlight rays diverge and illu-
minate not only the road ahead but the side of the road,2 35 that the distance
between the front tires of a automobile is about four and one-half feet,2 36
224. See State v. Tustin, 322 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
225. See Hoelscher v. Sel-Mor Garment Co., 430 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Mo. Ct. App.
1968).
226. See Schwane v. Kroger Co., 480 S.W.2d 113, 116-17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
227. Brooks v. Stewart, 335 S.W.2d 104, 112 (Mo. 1960); Spoeneman v. Uhri,
332 Mo. 821, 828-29, 60 S.W.2d 9, 12 (1933).
228. See Hay v. Ham, 364 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962); see also Bow-
man v. Kansas City, 361 Mo. 14, 27, 233 S.W.2d 26, 34 (1950) (en banc) (great
increase in the number of motor vehicles).
229. See Davis v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 326 S.W.2d 78, 86 (Mo. 1959).
230. See State v. Thornton, 441 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
231. See English v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 426 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Mo. 1968). Missouri
courts have refused to take notice of which use is primary. See id at 37.
232. See St. Joseph Light & Power Co. v. Ohlhausen, 621 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981).
233. See Hanff v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 355 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Mo. 1962).
234. See, e.g., State ex re. Kan. City S. Ry. v. Shain, 340 Mo. 1195, 1205, 105
S.W.2d 915, 921 (1937), quashing Adams v. Kansas City S. Ry. 83 S.W.2d 913
(1937) (en banc).
235. See Grimes v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 341 Mo. 129, 136, 106.S.W.2d 462, 465
(1937); Hauck v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 239 Mo. App. 1092, 1103, 200 S.W.2d
608, 614 (1947).
236. See Perry v. Dever, 303 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. 1957); Fisher v. Gunn, 270 S.W.2d
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and that ordinarily car length does not exceed twenty feet.237 Judicial no-
tice has been taken of facts relating to parking lots,23 filling stations,23 9
tires,2" and the construction of streets and roadways.2 4 ' Notice has been
taken that an outboard racing motor does not have a perpetual existence,24 2
and that gasoline is used to operate farm machinery, motor scooters,
motorcycles, outboard motors, lawn mowers, and pumps.2 43
Courts have noticed that people are made aware of peril through
warnings, 244 and that a person in front of a moving car cannot accurately
judge its speed.2 45 While the courts will not take judicial notice of the exact
distance within which a particular vehicle can be stopped,24 6 they will note
the limits247 or at least the maximum distances within which a truck24 or a
car249 can be stopped. Courts readily note the number of feet per second
237. See Bauman v. Conrad, 342 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
238. See, e.g., Bowman v. Kansas City, 361 Mo. 14, 27-28, 233 S.W.2d 26, 35
(1950) (en banc); Hopkins v. Sefton Fibre Can Co., 390 S.W.2d 907, 912 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1965).
239. See Walters v. Markwardt, 361 Mo. 936, 939, 237 S.W.2d 177, 179 (1951)
(fences would unreasonably interfere with use of grease pits in filling stations).
240. See Searry v. Neal, 509 S.W.2d 755, 760 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Crupe v.
Spicuzza, 86 S.W.2d 347, 350-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935).
241. See Fletcher v. North Mehornay Furniture Co., 359 Mo. 607, 614, 222
S.W.2d 789, 792 (1949); Domitz v. Springfield Bottlers, 359 Mo. 412, 414, 221
S.W.2d 831, 832 (1949); Bridges Asphalt Co. v. Jacobsmyer, 346 Mo. 609, 613, 142
S.W.2d 641, 643 (1940).
242. See Brunswick Corp. v. Hering, 619 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
243. See Tharp v. Monsees, 327 S.W.2d 889, 897 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
244. See Thompson v. Quincy, 0. & K.C. Ry., 18 S.W.2d 401, 406 (Mo. 1929).
245. See O'Donnell v. Wells, 323 Mo. 1170, 1178, 21 S.W.2d 762, 765 (1929); see
also Finch v. Kegevic, 486 S.W.2d 515, 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (the sight of a car
200 feet away traveling 30 miles an hour gives no impression of danger).
246. Highfill v. Brown, 340 S.W.2d 656, 664 (Mo. 1960) (en banc).
247. Id; Spoeneman v. Uhri, 332 Mo. 821, 829, 60 S.W.2d 9, 12 (1933).
248. See, e.g., Hinrichs v. Young, 403 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Mo. 1966); Richardson v.
Wendel, 401 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Mo. 1966); Johnson v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co.,
358 Mo. 253, 260, 214 S.W.2d 5, 10 (1948); Hutchinson v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d
903, 909-10 (Mo. 1943); Zickefoose v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 579, 590, 148 S.W.2d
784, 790 n.* (1941); Stimage v. Union Elec. Co., 465 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Mo. Ct. App.
1971); Crane v. Sirkin & Needles Moving Co., 85 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Mo. Ct. App.
1935); Johnson v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 72 S.W.2d 889, 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
249. Nelms v. Bright, 299 S.W.2d 483, 490 (Mo. 1957); State v. Manning, 612
S.W.2d 823, 826 n.4 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Eaves v. Wampler, 390 S.W.2d 922, 930
(Mo. Ct. App. 1965). See, e.g., McCarthy v. Wulff, 452 S.W.2d 164, 169 (Mo. 1970);
Richardson v. Wendel, 401 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Mo. 1966); Losh v. Benton, 382
S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1964); Wegener v. St. Louis County Transit Co., 357 S.W.2d 943,
947 (Mo. 1962) (en banc); Perry v. Dever, 303 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. 1957); Cope v.
Thompson, 534 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Finch v. Kegevic, 486
S.W.2d 515, 520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); Loyd v. Moore, 390 S.W.2d 951, 957 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1965); Hildreth v. Key, 341 S.W.2d 601, 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960). But see
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that can be traveled by a car moving at a certain speed in miles per hour.250
Notice has been taken that a modern car in good mechanical condition
responds quickly and accurately to turns of the steering wheel 25 ' and is
easily maneuverable,2 52 and that time must elapse between when a motorist
first sees a danger and the time when he applies the brakes.253 In the ab-
sence of evidence on reaction time, courts judicially notice that three-
fourths of a second is required.254 There are cases, however, that suggest
that it takes possibly a half255 or even a full second 256 for a person con-
Kinealy v. Goldstein, 400 S.W.2d 438, 446 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966) (time or distance it
takes a vehicle to avoid an object is a matter for expert testimony, not judicial
notice, given the factors of speed, size, and weight of vehicle, condition of brakes
and road, and load). See generally Judicial Notice-Disputability and Appellate Practice
Regarding Judicial Notice of Stopping Distances, 38 Mo. L. REV. 678 (1973).
250. See, e.g., Vietmeier v. Voss, 246 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Mo. 1952).
251. See Richardson v. Wendel, 401 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Mo. 1966); Payne v.
Smith, 322 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Mo. 1959); Brown v. Callicotte, 73 S.W.2d 190, 193
(Mo. 1934) ("Present day automobiles respond quickly and accurately to the touch
of the driver's hand on the steering wheel. The necessary impulse may be applied
in an instant."), quoted in Perry v. Dever, 303 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. 1957). Notice of the
responsiveness of vehicles is usually taken in the context of finding that an accident
could have been avoided by turning or swerving. See Jenkins v. Jordan, 593 S.W.2d
236, 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (en banc); Hildreth v. Key, 341 S.W.2d 601, 607 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1960) (en banc).
252. See Taylor v. Keirn, 622 S.W.2d 778, 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Jenkins v.
Jordan, 593 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (en banc).
253. See Vietmeier v. Voss, 246 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Mo. 1952); Dister v. Ludwig,
362 Mo. 162, 170, 240 S.W.2d 694, 698 (1951); Yeaman v. Storms, 358 Mo. 774,
779, 217 S.W.2d 495,498 (1948); Reed v. Burks, 393 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Mo. Ct. App.
1965).
254. See Vaeth v. Gegg, 486 S.W.2d 625, 627-28 (Mo. 1972); Koogler v. Mound
City Cab Co., 349 S.W.2d 233, 237 (Mo. 1961); McCreary v. Conroy, 611 S.W.2d
234, 235 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Gassiraro v. Merlo, 589 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979); Hill v. Barton, 579 S.W.2d 121, 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Bunch v.
McMillian, 568 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Schneider v. Finley, 553
S.W.2d 727, 731 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); see also West v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 295
S.W.2d 48, 54 (Mo. 1956); Wiseman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 575 S.W.2d 742, 749
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Stegall v. Wilson, 416 S.W.2d 658, 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967);
Johnson v. Weston, 330 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Edwards v. Dixon,
298 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957); McKinney v. Robbins, 273 S.W.2d 513,
517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954). This time is generally used to determine whether a vehi-
cle could have been stopped in time to avoid an accident. See, e.g., Hickerson v.
Portner, 325 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Mo. 1959); Danner v. Weinreich, 323 S.W.2d 746,
752 (Mo. 1959).
255. See, e.g., Bray v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 259 S.W.2d 132, 140 (Mo. Ct. App.
1953) (car traveling 60 miles an hour would cover 44 feet before brakes could take
effect).
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fronted with a danger to react and avoid it.257
5. Language, Words, and Phrases
Missouri courts take judicial notice of facts relating to language; they
have recognized that Spanish is the official language of Mexico, 258 and the
plain meaning of words.259 Judicial notice has been taken that "budget"
has a well-recognized meaning,260 that "printed" has a variety of meanings
depending on the context,2 6 ' that hootch, moonshine, and white mule con-
note the unlawful manufacture of whiskey,262 and that whiskey is intoxicat-
ing.263 Missouri courts have refused to notice that any beverage called beer
contains alcohol.2
Judicial notice has been taken that "money" commonly means some-
thing of value.2 65 It has been said to be common knowledge that "street" in
a legal sense may encompass all the separate areas of an easement such as
the parkway and the sidewalk,26 6 and that lands surrounded by water are
sometimes called islands.2 67 The supreme court has refused to notice the
definition of "female sportswear," 268 but Missouri courts have noted the
meaning of nicknames, 269 abbreviations,
2 70 and contractions.2
257. McKinney v. Robbins, 273 S.W.2d 513, 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954). Cf. Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. Crowl, 198 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir. 1952) (appreciable time).
258. See Booth v. Scott, 276 Mo. 1, 38, 205 S.W. 633, 644, cert. denied, 253 U.S.
475 (1918).
259. See First Nat'l Bank v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808, 817 (Mo.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 992, 1016 (1975).
260. See Graves v. Purcell, 337 Mo. 574, 583, 85 S.W.2d 543, 548 (1935) (en
banc).
261. See State ex re. Page v. Vossbrinck, 257 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo. Ct. App.
1953).
262. See State v. Wheeler, 318 Mo. 1173, 1178, 2 S.W.2d 777, 779 (1928); State
v. Johnson, 292 S.W. 41, 42 (Mo. 1927); State v. Wright, 312 Mo. 626, 632, 280
S.W. 703, 705 (1926).
263. See State v. Wright, 312 Mo. 626, 632, 280 S.W. 703, 705 (1926).
264. See State v. Maupin, 268 S.W.2d 39, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954). But see State
v. Mitchell, 134 Mo. App. 540, 114 S.W. 1113 (1908).
265. See State v. Gabriel, 342 Mo. 519, 526, 116 S.W.2d 75, 78 (1938).
266. See Quinn v. Graham, 428 S.W.2d 178, 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); see also
Lilly v. Bosnell, 362 Mo. 444, 452-53, 242 S.W.2d 73, 76 (1951) (city block is about
300 feet).
267. See Conran v. Girvin, 341 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Mo. 1960) (en banc).
268. See Coach House v. Ward Parkway Shops, 471 S.W.2d 464, 467 (Mo.
1971).
269. See State v. Cook, 463 S.W.2d 863, 868 (Mo. 1971) ("Sam").
270. See State v. Dowling, 202 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947) ("d/b/a").
271. See South Mo. Land Co. v. Jeffries, 40 Mo. App. 360, 361 (1890) ("supt.").
But see McNichol v. Pacific Express Co., 12 Mo. App. 401, 407 (1882).
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6. Customs and Common Practices
Judicial notice has been taken of the normal walking speed.27 2 It has
been said that "the ordinary walking speed of the average man is two to
three miles per hour, more nearly the latter, '27 3 or 2.9 to 4.4 feet per sec-
ond,27 4 and that a ten year old would walk at approximately the same
speed.27 5 It has been said that the running speed of a nine year old child is
around five or six miles an hour or 7.3 to 8.8 feet per second.
276
Notice has been taken of the "curiosities and propensities of small chil-
dren, 2 7  including that young children like to put things in their
mouths,278 that their acts are wholly unpredictable, 279 and that a four year
old has no appreciation of the dangers of a roadway.28 0 Notice has been
taken that memory fades with time,28 ' that the Meramac River is known as
a popular fishing spot,112 and that people ordinarily do not enter cemeteries
at night.2 3 Courts have noted that golfers call "fore" before swinging,
28 4
and that people observe daylight time by setting their clocks forward one
hour on the last Sunday in April.28 5 It has been said to be common knowl-
edge that an individual's handwriting varies noticeably from time to
time,28 6 that one intending to shoot himself would be likely to place the
272. Robinson v. Richardson, 484 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
273. See Dister v. Ludwig, 362 Mo. 162, 170, 240 S.W.2d 694, 698 (1951) (en
banc) (average man walking a little faster gait would travel approximately 31/ miles
per hour). But cf. Schilling v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 414 S.W.2d 818, 826 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1967) (fact that a normal walking step is 2.5 feet is not of sufficient notoriety
to deserve notice).
274. McFarland v. Wildhaber, 334 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 1960). See State v. Burley,
523 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (average walking speed is 2.9 to 4.4 feet
per second and notice was taken that average man can walk a mile in 15 minutes);
see also Miller v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 389 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Mo. 1965); Bunch
v. Mueller, 365 Mo. 494, 498, 284 S.W.2d 440, 443 (1955) (en banc); Delay v. Ward,
364 Mo. 431, 442, 262 S.W.2d 628, 635 (1953) (en banc); Edwards v. Dixon, 298
S.W.2d 466, 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).
275. See Bunch v. Mueller, 365 Mo. 494, 498, 284 S.W.2d 440, 443 (1955) (en
banc).
276. See Edwards v. Dixon, 298 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).
277. Norwood v. Lazarus, 634 S.W.2d 584, 587 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
278. See Davoren v. Kansas City, 308 Mo. 513, 514, 273 S.W. 401, 404 (1925).
279. See Ozbun v. Vance, 323 S.W.2d 771, 775 (Mo. 1959).
280. Id
281. See Klopstein v. Schroll House Moving Co., 425 S.W.2d 498, 504 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1968).
282. See Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 839, 269 S.W.2d 17, 20 (1954) (en banc).
283. See State v. Metje, 269 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954).
284. See Page v. Unterreiner, 106 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937).
285. See Playboy Club, Inc. v. Myers, 431 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Mo. 1968).
286. See Whetsel v. Forgey, 323 Mo. 681, 691, 20 S.W.2d 523, 526 (1929).
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weapon near or against himself,2"7 that property taxes are paid annually at
the end of the year,2 88 and that gasoline used in farm machinery, motor
scooters, motorcycles, outboard motors, lawn mowers, and pumps is poured
from containers into gas tanks.
2 8 9
It has been said to be common knowledge that a curved and raised
surface can cause a person to fall and is not as safe as a flat surface,290 and
that swimming pools are often present in parks and playgrounds.291 While
the Missouri Supreme Court has taken judicial notice that bachelor apart-
ments ordinarily do not have kitchens, 292 the court has refused to notice the
time at which occupants of certain residences are likely to retire,293 the ad-
dress at which a person lived, the character of a neighborhood,2 94 or that it
is customary to have railings on the front porches of public buildings.
2 95
Courts have refused to notice that it is customary to put lights on bicycles
used at night 29 6 or that it is customary to leave hay chutes in a barn
open.29 7 While it has been said to be common knowledge that clothes trees
are in general use,2 98 the supreme court has refused to notice that trees of a
particular construction are customarily used in restaurants.
299
7. Law and Legal Processes
It has been said to be common knowledge that persons of good charac-
ter are less likely to commit crimes than people of lesser character,300 and
judicial notice has been taken that it is much easier to prove the good repu-
287. See Lynch v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 375 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Mo. Ct. App.
1964).
288. See Kirkpatrick v. Rose, 344 S.W.2d 59, 60-61 (Mo. 1961).
289. See Tharp v. Monsees, 327 S.W.2d 889, 897 (Mo. 1959) (en bane).
290. See Ecker v. Big Bend Bank, 407 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
291. See Berberich v. Concordia Gymnastic Soc'y, 402 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1966).
292. See Evans v. Roth, 356 Mo. 237, 249, 201 S.W.2d 357, 364 (1947) (en banc).
293. See Sandbothe v. City of Olivette, 647 S.W.2d 198, 204 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983).
294. See Calvin F. Feutz Funeral Home v. Estate of Werner, 417 S.W.2d 25, 28
(Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
295. See Endicott v. St. Regis Inv. Co., 443 S.W.122, 126 (Mo. 1969); see also
Shaw v. Butterworth, 327 Mo. 622, 630, 38 S.W.2d 57, 61 (1931) (secondary pur-
pose of screens is keeping people from falling through windows and they should
withstand pressure of someone leaning on them).
296. See Beebe v. Kansas City, 223 Mo. App. 642, 646, 17" S.W.2d 608, 610
(1929).
297. See Moellman v. Gieze-Henselmeier Lumber Co., 134 Mo. App. 485, 489-
90, 114 S.W. 1023, 1024 (1908).
298. Freeman v. Myron Green Cafeterias Co., 317 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Mo. 1958)
(en banc).
299. See id
300. State v. Gurnee, 309 Mo. 6, 17, 274 S.W. 58, 61 (1925).
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tation of a party or witness than to impeach it.30 ' It has been said to com-
mon knowledge that wills often contain latent ambiguities,3 °2 that workers'
injuries are compensable without regard to fault, 3 and that witnesses can-
not agree on the exact language in a statement.30 4 Judicial notice may be
taken that an article or treatise is authoritative for cross examination. 30 5
Notice has been taken that firearms are deadly,30 6 and that striking a
person on the head with a pistol butt can cause death or great bodily
harm. 30 7 It is common knowledge that burglaries occur,308 even in build-
ings that have alarm systems and are not in high crime areas, 30 9 and that
gloves and crowbars are tools of burglars and thieves.3 0 Notice has been
taken that robbers often leave cars with the engine running and a driver at
the wheel to facilitate escape,3 1 ' and that robbery victims are often forced
into vehicles and transported to distant locations.3 12 It has been said to be
common knowledge that private persons rarely file complaints,3 13 that per-
sons who are indicted are not always apprehended during the term in which
the indictment is returned,31 4 that persons charged with offenses are con-
fined in jails,3 15 that fingerprints are taken of persons who are convicted or
taken into custody, 316 that police officers officially report their findings con-
necting a defendant with an offense,31 7 and that bloodhounds are used in
apprehending escapees from penal institutions.3" Judicial notice is one
301. See State v. Reed, 250 Mo. 379, 385, 157 S.W. 316, 318 (1913).
302. Bernheimer v. First Nat'l Bank, 359 Mo. 1119, 1121, 225 S.W.2d 745, 755
(1949).
303. Littel v. Bi-State Transit Dev. Agency, 423 S.W.2d 34, 37 (Mo. Ct. App.
1967).
304. See McBride v. Mercantile Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 330 Mo. 259, 272,
48 S.W.2d 922, 926 (1932); see alo Messer v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 274 S.W. 864, 867
(Mo. Ct. App. 1925).
305. Kansas City v. Dugan, 524 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
306. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 182 S.W. 159, 161 (Mo. 1916) (pistol); State v.
Mace, 262 Mo. 143, 153, 170 S.W. 1105, 1108 (1914) (shotgun).
307. See State v. Young, 570 S.W.2d 324, 326 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
308. Barad v. Leppert Roos Fur Co., 442 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
309. Id
310. See State v. Russell, 324 S.W.2d 727, 731 (Mo. 1959).
311. See State v. Simon, 317 Mo. 336, 344, 295 S.W. 1076, 1079 (1927).
312. See id
313. See State ex rel McKittrick v. Graves, 346 Mo. 990, 1002, 144 S.W.2d 91,
98 (1940).
314. See State v. Malone, 301 S.W.2d 750, 755 (Mo. 1957).
315. See State v. Nasello, 325 Mo. 442, 468, 30 S.W.2d 132, 141 (1932).
316. See State v. Hampton, 275 S.W.2d 356, 359 (Mo. 1955).
317. See State v. Miller, 360 S.W.2d 633, 637 (Mo. 1962); State v. Hurd, 520
S.W.2d 158, 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
318. See State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507, 517 (Mo. 1968).
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means to establish that a party lacks standing. 319
The courts will not take judicial notice of the existence of an antagonis-
tic feeling against a defendant,3 2' and an appellate court would not notice
that there had been considerable publicity in the state concerning ap-
pointed counsel for indigent defendants.32 1
8. Public Officials
Missouri courts will take judicial notice of facts relating to public of-
ficers, including their authority, terms of office, signatures, and seals. No-
tice has been taken that the Secretary of State, the Director of Revenue,
and the Superintendent of the State Highway Patrol all head executive de-
partments with offices located in Jefferson City.3 22 The powers and duties
of a police judge,323 that a certain person was a federal judge,324 and that a
person was no longer a magistrate 25 have all been noticed. Notice has
been taken of the seals of notaries public,32 6 various public authorities,3 27
and state political subdivisions.3 28
9. Court Rules, Procedures, and Records
Appellate courts will not take judicial notice of circuit court rules3 29 or
customs;3 31 if counsel relies on such rules, they must be made part of the
319. Spencer's River Road's Bowling Lanes v. Unico Management Co., 615
S.W.2d 121, 124 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
320. See State v. Arnett, 338 Mo. 907, 917, 92 S.W.2d 897, 903 (1936).
321. See State v. Lyell, 634 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (doubt as to
notoriety).
322. See State ex rel Toberman v. Cook, 365 Mo. 274, 279, 281 S.W.2d 777, 780
(1955) (en banc).
323. State v. White, 263 S.W. 192, 194 (Mo. 1924).
324. State v. Collins, 394 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Mo. 1965).
325. State ex rel United Bonding Co. v. Kennedy, 364 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1963).
326. See State v. Zehnder, 182 Mo. App. 161, 167, 168 S.W. 661, 662 (1914).
327. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 104.190 (1978) (Highway Employees and Highway
Patrol Retirement System); id § 104.480 (Missouri State Employees Retirement
System); id § 226. 100 (State Highway Commission); id § 339.130 (Missouri Real
Estate Commission); id § 386.180 (Public Service Commission).
328. See Vanderhoffv. Lawrence, 201 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947); see
also Mo. REv. STAT. § 248.050 (1978) (requires notice of sanitary districts).
329. State v. Hinojosa, 242 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo. 1951). See In re Marriage of Dick-
ey, 553 S.W.2d 538, 540 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Bank v. Pfeil, 537 S.W.2d 680,
681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Head v. Ken Bender Buick Pontiac, 452 S.W.2d 596, 597
(Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Cusack v. Green, 252 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952);
Bowen v. Mossman, 240 Mo. App. 1202, 1207, 226 S.W.2d 404, 407 (1950); Gilpin
v. Aetna Fire Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 566, 585, 132 S.W.2d 686, 697 (1939); Fox
Miller Grain Co. v. Stephens, 217 S.W. 994, 997 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920).
330. Bowen v. Mossman, 240 Mo. App. 1202, 1207, 226 S.W.2d 404, 407 (1950).
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record.3"' Notice has been taken of terms of court,3 3 2 where courts are
held, 3 3 and that a given county circuit court is held in more than one
place. 3 4
A court can judicially notice its own records3 3 5 and the files in the case
before it,33' and it has "long been settled that a court . . . should take
judicial notice of its own records at prior proceedings which involve the
same parties and basically the same facts.",3 3 ' Higher courts will take notice
of their own records3 3 8 and of the records of prior actions between the same
parties in the same case,13 9 including the proceedings below34 ° as well as
prior suits involving the same subject matter.3 4 ' Appellate courts have ac-
knowledged that a notice of appeal filed in a case originally named two
331. Bank v. Pfeil, 537 S.W.2d 680, 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Head v. Ken
Bender Buick Pontiac, 452 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
332. See State ex rel. Midwest Pipe & Supply Co. v. Haid, 330 Mo. 1093, 1096,
52 S.W.2d 183, 185 (1932) (en banc).
333. See City of Charleston ex rel Brady v. McCutcheon, 360 Mo. 157, 161, 227
S.W.2d 736, 739 (1950) (en banc).
334. See State v. Logan, 268 Mo. 169, 175, 186 S.W. 979, 980 (1916); see also
State ex rel. Ford v. Hogan, 324 Mo. 1130, 1138, 27 S.W.2d 21, 23 (1930).
335. Knorp v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 44, 52, 175 S.W.2d 889, 894 (1943). See, e.g.,
Bray v. Bray, 629 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Feese v. Feese, 613 S.W.2d
882, 886 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Collett, 526 S.W.2d 920, 929 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975). But see Wolff v. Wolff, 628 S.W.2d 923, 924 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (refusal
to notice memorandum cited from earlier hearing in same court by different judge).
336. Bayte v. State, 599 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). See, e.g., Franklin
v. State, 572 S.W.2d 897, 898 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
337. Schrader v. State, 561 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
338. See State v. Johnson, 336 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Mo. 1960); State v. Green, 305
S.W.2d 863, 869 (Mo. 1957); State v. Collett, 526 S.W.2d 920, 929 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975). A court will ordinarily not take notice of facts in a party's brief. State v.
Davit, 343 Mo. 1151, 1158, 125 S.W.21d 47, 52 (1938); Thompson v. State, 569
S.W.2d 380, 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
339. See State v. Thompson, 324 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Mo. 1959) (en banc) (notice
that court had reviewed same issues on petition for writ of habeas corpus). In state
habeas corpus cases, courts will take judicial notice of transcripts filed in earlier
direct appeals. See Evans v. State, 639 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); see also
Langdon v. Koch, 435 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (notice on appeal of
transcript filed in the first appeal of previously appealed and remanded case).
340. See State v. Keeble, 399 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Mo. 1966); First Nat'l Bank v.
Christopher, 624 S.W.2d 474, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). The court of appeals may
notice events occurring after notice of appeal if those events are closely interwoven
or clearly interdependent with the appeal. Smitty's Super Mkts. v. Retail Store
Employees Local 322, 637 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). But see Cribbs v.
Keystone Am. Serv. Corp., 572 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
341. See, e.g., Burton v. State, 641 S.W.2d 95, 100 n.6 (Mo. 1982) (en banc)
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parties instead of the one shown in the transcript. 342
In ruling on appeals from denials of habeas corpus motions, appellate
courts have taken judicial notice of the procedural history.4 3 and tran-
scripts of similar earlier motions. 3"4 Notice of the transcripts in criminal
cases has been taken by courts of appeals345 and the supreme court 346 in
appeals from denials motions to vacate convictions. Trial courts may take
judicial notice of their own records,347 files, 348 and prior proceedings, 3 49
and the records and proceedings of appellate courts,3 5 ° when the records
relate to prior proceedings that include the same parties and the same
facts.351 When a party files a motion, a trial court is entitled to notice that
a similar motion had already been filed and overruled, but not appealed.3 52
A trial court may notice in one case a suit for an injunction which had been
342. See Kamo Elec. Coop. v. Brooks, 337 S.W.2d 444, 445 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
343. See Clark v. State, 602 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
344. See Keller v. State, 566 S.W.2d 260, 262 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
345. See Johnson v. State, 581 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Chambers
v. State, 554 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
346. See State v. Hooper, 399 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo. 1966).
347. Arata v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 351 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Mo. 1961); Knorp v.
Thompson, 352 Mo. 44, 52, 175 S.W.2d 889, 894 (1943); Bray v. Bray, 629 S.W.2d
658, 660 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Tudor v. Tudor, 617 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981); State v. Armstrong, 605 S.W.2d 526, 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Hankins v.
Hankins, 462 S.W.2d 818, 826 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); see also Wells v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co., 459 S.W.2d 253, 256, 258 (Mo. 1970) (en banc) (trial court
properly took notice of record in prior action which counsel asked to have noticed).
348. Pemberton v. Ladue Realty & Constr. Co., 359 Mo. 907, 908, 224 S.W.2d
383, 385 (1949); Vonder Haar Concrete Co. v. Edwards-Parker, Inc., 561 S.W.2d
134, 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
349. State v. Berry, 609 S.W.2d 948, 955 (Mo. 1980) (en banc); Pizzurro v. Es-
tate of Hichew, 568 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); State v. Stidham, 403
S.W.2d 616, 618 (Mo. 1966); State v. Floyd, 403 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Mo. 1966); State
v. Wade, 635 S.W.2d 51, 55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Moore, 633 S.W.2d 140,
146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Tettamble, 517 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Mo. Ct. App.
1974).
350. See Pemberton v. Ladue Realty & Constr. Co., 359 Mo. 907, 908, 224
S.W.2d 383, 384 (1949).
351. Schrader v. State, 561 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). See, e.g., Piz-
zurro v. Estate of Hichew, 568 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Mo 1978) (en banc); Land Clear-
ance for Redev. Auth. v. Robinson, 611 S.W.2d 291, 292-93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); see
also Hardin v. Hardin, 512 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). But see In re
Drew, 637 S.W.2d 772, 777-78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (trial court did not err in refus-
ing to take judicial notice of prior probate proceeding); Wolff v. Wolff, 628 S.W.2d
923, 924 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (trial court sustained in refusing to take judicial
notice of a memorandum explaining a decision where the trial judge and the judge
who approved an earlier decree which the memorandum accompanied were not the
same).
352. Munday v. Thielecke, 483 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
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instituted in the same court by the same parties.35 Finally, notice of prior
proceedings has been taken to determine whether punishment enhance-
ment statutes apply,3 5 4 and courts hearing post-conviction motions fre-
quently notice the original proceedings.
3 5 5
Missouri courts usually will not notice matters of record in other
courts a3 6 or records and facts in other actions,35 7 unless they are put in evi-
dence. 3 5 The supreme court has refused to notice cited litigation involving
the same subject matter as the case in question,3 5 9 and other Missouri
courts have refused to notice records in other courts,3 60 even when those
records are incorporated into briefs.361 This rule may be relaxed, however,
depending on the facts and on whether expediency and justice require.3 62
When another case is closely interwoven or interdependent, 63 or other ap-
propriate circumstances exist, courts will consider the records of other
353. Sierk v. Reynolds, 484 S.W.2d 675, 682 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). See also Es-
tate of Kielhafner, 639 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (notice of "unseemly
conflict" between two brothers who were coexecutors of zin estate).
354. See State v. Berry, 609 S.W.2d 948, 955 (Mo. 1980) (en banc) (judicial no-
tice of evidence in prior proceedings did not violate the defendant's constitutional
rights); State v. Moore, 633 S.W.2d 140, 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (judicial notice of
trial just completed to support finding of persistent or dangerous behavior); State v.
Johnson, 605 S.W.2d 151, 155 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (judicial notice of trial to estab-
lish that defendant had been previously convicted of a violent felony).
355. See Schrader v. State, 561 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (notice of
records reflecting what took place at hearing on guilty plea); see also State v. Keeble,
399 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Mo. 1966) (in determining whether defendant was afforded
effective assistance of counsel, trial court properly took notice on motion to vacate
judgment of the trial files and records).
356. State v. Moreland, 351 S.W.2d 33, 37 (Mo. 1961); State v. Cullett, 526
S.W.2d 920, 929 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Kansas City v. Mathis, 409 S.W.2d 280, 288
(Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
357. Knorp v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 44, 51, 175 S.W.2d 889, 893 (1943); In re
Drew, 637 S.W.2d 772, 777-78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Drane, 581 S.W.2d 89,
92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Haynes v. State, 534 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976);
Layton v. State, 500 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
358. State v. Umfleet, 538 S.W.2d 55, 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Layton v. State,
500 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
359. See England v. Eckley, 330 S.W.2d 738, 743-44 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
360. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 497 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)
(circuit court of one county without authority to notice records and judgments of
probate court in another county). But see Mo. REV. STAT. § 483.660 (1978) (makes
records of probate court records of the circuit court as of January 2, 1979).
361. Thompson v. State, 569 S.W.2d 380, 382-83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
362. In re Drew, 637 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Drane v. State, 581
S.W.2d 89, 92-93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Layton v. State, 500 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1973).
363. Smitty's Super Mkts. v. Retail Store Employees Local 322, 637 S.W.2d 148,
151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Beavers, 591 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979); State v. Hawkins, 582 S.W.2d 333, 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
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When the same parties, basic facts, and general claims are involved,
courts may notice records from other proceedings either on their own mo-
tion3 65 or at the request of a party.366 In ruling on a motion to vacate a
judgment, a court may notice its own files and records in the related crimi-
nal proceeding,3 67 and courts of appeals have noticed transcripts filed in a
defendant's prior appeal to the supreme court in order to determine if the
appeal raises new issues." 8 It is appropriate to notice the records of various
criminal trials to substantiate claims of gender discrimination in jury selec-
tion.3 69 Ordinarily, however, when the record in another case forms an es-
sential element of a party's claim or defense, the record itself must be
introduced in evidence unless admitted by the adversary.3 70 In ruling on
an attorney's application for fees earned in handling proceedings relating to
the rehabilitation of an insurance company, the supreme court acknowl-
edged its right to notice proceedings ancillary to the main cause, but con-
cluded that where the services in question extended over several years and
involved various duties, it was inappropriate to attempt to notice every-
thing that formed the basis for the claim.
37 1
III. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF LEGISLATIVE FACTS
A. Generaly
In theory, legislative and adjudicative facts are quite different. Adjudi-
cative facts are relevant to the resolution of a specific dispute,3 72 while legis-
364. Knorp v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 44, 52, 175 S.W.2d 889, 894 (1943). See also
Meiners Co. v. Clayton Greens Nursing Center, 645 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Layton v. State, 500 S.W. 267, 269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); cf Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 483.670 (1978) (records of magistrate court are records of circuit court).
365. See Schrader v. State, 561 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
366. Hardin v. Hardin, 512 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). See also State
v. Hawkins, 582 S.W.2d 333, 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (cases may be so closely
interwoven or so clearly interdependent as to allow judicial notice in one suit of the
proceedings in another).
367. State v. Stidham, 403 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Mo. 1966); State v. Keeble, 399
S.W.2d 118, 122 (Mo. 1966); State v. Connor, 500 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973).
368. Chambers v. State, 554 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Layton v.
State, 500 S.W.2d 267, 269-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
369. State v. Hawkins, 582 S.W.2d 333, 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
370. State v. Cullen, 646 S.W.2d 850, 855 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Meiners Co. v.
Clayton Greens Nursing Center, 645 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Rich-
ards Brick Co. v. Wright, 231 Mo. App. 946, 955, 82 S.W.2d 274, 279 (1935).
371. Scherfler v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 355 Mo. 886, 895-96, 169 S.W.2d
359, 365-66 (1943). See also Richard's Brick Co. v. Wright,' 231 Mo. App. 946, 955,
82 S.W.2d 274, 279 (1935) (court refused to notice equitable mechanics lien pend-
ing in same court).
372. FED. R. EvID. 201(c) advisory committee note.
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lative facts explain social, economic, or political matters that a judge
considers in making or interpreting law.373 Legislative facts are almost al-
ways subject to dispute.3 74 In jurisdictions where indisputability is a pre-
requisite to judicial notice of adjudicative facts, the line between
adjudicative and legislative facts is relatively clear. When indisputability is
not a prerequisite, as in Missouri, the distinction is vague.
Although Missouri courts do not distinguish between legislative and
adjudicative facts, they have noticed a wide range of facts that might fairly
be characterized as legislative. Neither the Missouri courts nor the federal
rules have established procedures for judicial notice of legislative facts.3 75
As Justice Holmes stated in Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 376 "the court may
ascertain as it sees fit any fact that is merely a ground for laying down a rule
of law." '377 Professor Davis has suggested three methods that a court might
employ to notice legislative facts: (1) allow presentation of evidence and
cross-examination; (2) allow presentation of evidence but not cross-exami-
nation; or (3) deny any opportunity to comment.3 7 s Missouri courts gener-
ally follow the third approach.37 9
B. Factual Basis of Legislation
Judicial notice of legislative facts is most frequently taken in the course
of reviewing the reasonableness of legislation. Parties challenging legisla-
tion under the equal protection clause cannot prevail on a claim that the
clause is irrational if it is evident from all the considerations presented to
the legislature and noticed by the court that the question is at least debata-
ble.38 0 Courts must make determinations about legislation not upon proof
of facts or conditions, but on the theory that judicial notice provides proof
of those things within the common knowledge and experience of all men.
38 1
Notice has been taken that water fluoridation is controversial and
therefore a city ordinance requiring fluoridation is legislative in nature and
subject to a referendum. 38 It has been noticed that bus and other motor
carrier operations frequently require temporary substitution or loans of ve-
373. Comment, Judicial Notice, 48 Miss. LJ. 919, 920 (1970). Some facts are
legislative and adjudicative. See, e.g., Ozbun v. Vance, 323 S.W.2d 771, 775-76
(Mo. 1959).
374. Comment, supra note 373, at 922.
375. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 12.6, at 424 (1979).
376. 264 U.S. 543 (1924).
377. Id. at 548.
378. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 375, § 12.6, at 424.
379. See notes 380-401 infra.
380. Mid-State Distrib. v. City of Columbia, 617 S.W.2d 419, 424-25 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981).
381. ABC Liquidators v. City of Kan. City, 322 S.W.2d 876, 885 (Mo. 1959).
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hicles, and that protection of the public requires that insurance companies
cover such vehicles even though they are not specifically described in the
policy."' 3 Similarly, it has been said to be common knowledge that food
and shelter are among man's basic needs and are often provided by the
same establishment; therefore, an ordinance prohibiting racial discrimina-
tion in such establishments was not an unconstitutional special law since it
did not include other businesses."' It has been said that because the sale of
goods at auction is ordinarily accompanied by noise and crowds, legislation
prohibiting such sales on Sundays is not invalid."8 5 In the course of uphold-
ing statutes requiring devices to protect workers, notice has been taken that
the inhaling of fumes, dust, and gases used in the manufacture of paint will
result in "painter's colic."38 6 The courts have refused to notice the cause of
combined sclerosis38 7 and have refused to declare that as a matter of com-
"mon knowledge pneumonia is an infectious disease intended to be excluded
by the workers' compensation act. 8 8
C. Factual Basis of Rules of Law
Courts frequently use commonly known facts as bases for rules of law.
Because it is common knowledge that passengers in automobiles rely on
drivers to exercise the highest degree of care, this reliance is not negli-
gent.38 9 The supreme court has held that an injurious quantity of carbon
monoxide in a bus bespeaks negligence, 390 that the frequency of highway
robberies makes it reasonable for truck drivers to carry guns,39 1 and that it
is not negligent to use waxes and cloths on floors in view of their common
use for this purpose. 39 2 It has been noticed that practical methods exist for
illuminating switchyards, so employers have a duty to provide such light-
ing.39 3 Noticing that the acts of children are unpredictable, courts have
held that greater precautions are necessary to fulfill the duty of care toward
them.3 94 Gender discrimination in jury selection has also been noticed.39 5
383. Davis v. Ashlock, 338 S.W.2d 816, 826 (Mo. 1960).
384. Marshall v. City of Kan. City, 355 S.W.2d 877, 884 (Mo. 1962) (en banc).
385. ABC Liquidators v. City of Kan. City, 322 S.W.2d 876, 884 (Mo. 1959).
386. Boll v. Condie-Bray Glass & Paint Co., 321 Mo. 92, 101, 11 S.W.2d 48, 52
(1928).
387. See Wolf v. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 336 Mo. 653, 656, 81 S.W.2d 323,
332 (1934).
388. See Rinehart v. F.M. Stamper Co., 55 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Mo. Ct. App.
1932).
389. Worley v. Tucker Nevils, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Mo. 1973) (en banc);
Fann v. Farmer, 289 S.W.2d 144, 148 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
390. Thomas v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 289 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Mo. Ct. App.
1956).
391. Arnold v. Wigdor Furniture Co., 281 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Mo. 1955).
392. Lawson v. Higgins, 350 Mo. 1066, 1068, 169 S.W.2d 881, 882-83 (1943).
393. Cleghorn v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 289 S.W.2d 13, 18 (Mo. 1956).
394. Harris v. Lane, 379 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
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A variety of facts have been noticed in establishing rules of evidence.
Based on notice that character evidence is distracting and confusing, the
courts have prevented prosecutors from proving the bad character of the
accused as part of the State's case in chief.3 96 In 1895, it was said to be
common knowledge that a poor reputation for chastity affected a woman's
character but not a man's.3 97 Twenty-two years later, however, the
supreme court refused to notice that a citizen who is not quiet or law abid-
ing is necessarily a perjurer."9 8 Finally, based on the belief among lawyers
that a jury's knowledge that the defendant is injured is prejudicial, the
court has recognized that corrective instructions are insufficient to over-
come the effect of improper references to insurance.
39 9
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is based on the ability of the courts to
notice that a particular accident would not have occured unless some party
was negligent.' Common knowledge is not sufficient, however, for deter-
mining whether a doctor's acts or omissions are negligent. 4"
IV. JUDICIAL KNOWLEDGE OF LAW
This section explores the legislative acts, judicial decisions, and other
legal materials of which Missouri courts will inform themselves. Although
obtaining knowledge of the law is perhaps more appropriately a subject for
to rules of procedure," 2 Missouri courts speak of judicial notice of law and
consider it a rule of evidence.4° 3 Unlike notice of adjudicative facts, how-
ever, notice of law is often required 4 and conclusive.40 3
Missouri courts take judicial notice of state law, including constitu-
tional provisions,40 6 statutes,4 0 7 appellate decisions, 40 8 and general customs
395. State v. Hawkins, 582 S.W.2d 333, 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
396. See State v. Reed, 250 Mo. 379, 380, 157 S.W. 316, 318 (1913).
397. State v. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519, 531, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (1895).
398. State v. Baird, 271 Mo. 9, 16, 195 S.W. 1010, 1013 (1917).
399. Trent v. Lechtman Printing Co., 141 Mo. App. 437, 439, 126 S.W. 238, 243
(1910).
400. Anello v. Kansas City, 286 S.W.2d 49, 52-53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955); Russell
v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 245 S.W. 590, 591 (Mo. Ct. App. 1922).
401. See Mercer v. Thornton, 646 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Yoos v.
Jewish Hosp., 645 S.W.2d 177, 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
402. FED. R. EvID. 201 advisory committee note.
403. See, e.g., Newson v. City of Kan. City, 606 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980). But see Damijan v. Harp, 340 S.W.2d 728, 734 (Mo. 1960) (the introduction
into evidence of domestic statutes is improper).
404. See Mo. BAR C.L.E., supra note 1, § 7.12.
405. See Newson v. City of Kan. City, 606 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
406. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Allison, 296 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Mo.
1956) (en banc); Moulder v. Webb, 527 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). See
Carmody v. St. Louis Transit Co., 188 Mo. 572, 573, 87 S.W. 913, 914 (1905); State
ex re. Markwell v. Colt, 199 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947).
407. In 1893, the rule was that judicial notice of public statutes was required.
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and usages.4 "9 Courts have a duty to notice these items, even if not re-
quested by the parties.4 11 Notice has been taken of statutes governing the
right to detain shoplifters,4 2 definitions of crimes, 41 3 and the powers and
duties of state agencies.41 4 In 1909, judicial notice was taken that attorneys
were required by statute to be at least twenty-one, 415 and in 1948 judicial
notice was taken that segregation is common.41 6 On occasion, notice has
been taken that certain acts are not illegal or that laws do not require cer-
tain actions, including the absence of a legal obligation for children to sup-
port their parents.
4 17
Missouri courts have judicially noticed public acts, even though only
local in nature or impact,4 " and notice of many local actions is now re-
See Bowen v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 118 Mo. 541, 544, 24 S.W. 436, 437 (1893); see also
State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Allison, 296 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Mo. 1956) (en
banc); State v. Bubenyak, 56 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Mo. 1932); State ex rel. Ford v. Hogan,
324 Mo. 1130, 1138, 27 S.W.2d 21, 23 (1930); State ex rel. Gagnepain v. Daves, 322
Mo. 376, 384, 15 S.W.2d 815, 817 (1929) (en banc); State v. Harris, 564 S.W.2d 561,
567-68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Moulder v. Webb, 527 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975); Ingalls v. Newfeld, 487 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 3.090(2) (1978) (statute books are only prima facie evidence of the law).
408. See State v. Davis, 645 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Matthews v. Mc-
Vay, 241 Mo. App., 998, 1006, 234 S.W.2d 983, 988 (1951).
409. See Frank v. Herring, 240 Mo. App. 425, 434, 208 S.W.2d 783, 788 (1948).
410. See Bowen v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 118 Mo. 541,547, 24 S.W. 436, 437 (1893);
Newson v. City of Kan. City, 606 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); State v.
Hutchens, 604 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Bly v. Skaggs Drug Centers, 562
S.W.2d 723, 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Moulder v. Webb, 527 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1975).
411. State v. Kuhrts, 571 S.W.2d 709, 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
412. See Bly v. Skaggs Drug Centers, 562 S.W.2d 723, 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
413. See, e.g., State v. Wickizer, 583 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (defi-
nition of felony and the contents of Mo. REv. STAT. § 560.161.2 (1969)); State v.
Sales, 610 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (felonious assault without malice
aforethought was a mixed felony and that felony by definition was an offense pun-
ishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary); State v. Hutchens, 604 S.W.2d 26, 28
(Mo. Ct. App.) (schedule of controlled substances), cer. denied, 449 U.S. 1020 (1980);
State v. Gunn, 599 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (first degree robbery is a
felony); State v. Mueller, 598 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (marijuana is a
controlled substance).
414. See, e.g., State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Allison, 296 S.W.2d 104,
106 (Mo. 1956) (en banc) (highway commission); State ex rel Mayfield v. City of
Joplin, 485 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (statutes concerning selection,
employment, and discharges in second class cities).
415. See State v. Gebhardt, 219 Mo. 708, 718, 119 S.W. 350, 352 (1909).
416. Frank v. Herring, 240 Mo. App. 425, 434, 208 S.W.2d 783, 788 (1948).
417. See Nichols v. State Social Sec. Comm'n, 156 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1942).
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quired by the constitution or by statute. The Missouri Constitution pro-
vides that notice shall be taken of city4 19 and county charters,42 ° and of
plans to consolidate governmental functions of the city and county of St.
Louis.4 21 A statute422 and the civil rules4 23 require courts to notice private
statutes if referred to the title of the statute and the place in the session laws
or revised statutes where it can be found.424
Neither trial nor appellate courts may take judicial notice of city or
county ordinances; 425 they must be proven like any other fact.426 Unless an
ordinance is admitted into evidence 427 or stipulated to,428 the court does
not know its terms; 4 29 prosecutions,430 license revocations,431 and other ac-
419. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 19. See State ex rel Mayfield v. City of Joplin, 485
S.W.2d 473, 476 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); State ex re. Voss v. Davis, 418 S.W.2d 163,
172 (Mo. 1967); City of Hannibal v. Winchester, 391 S.W.2d 279, 286 (Mo. 1965)
(en banc); Purdy v. Foreman, 547 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Schmitt v.
City of Hazelwood, 487 S.W.2d 882, 886 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); see also Mo. CONST.
art. VII, § 33 (requiring judicial notice of charter of the City of St. Louis).
420. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 18(j). See Laclede Gas Co. v. City of Woodson Ter-
race, 622 S.W.2d 315, 319 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Tonkin v. Jackson County
Merit Sys. Comm'n, 599 S.W.2d, 25, 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
421. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 30(b).
422. Mo. REV. STAT. § 509.220 (1978).
423. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 55.21(a).
424. See, e.g., Schmitt v. City of Hazelwood, 387 S.W.2d 882, 886 (Mo. Ct. App.
1972).
425. Consumer Contact Co. v. State Dep't of Revenue, 592 S.W.2d 782, 785
(Mo. 1980) (en banc). See General Motors v. Fair Employment Practices Div., 574
S.W.2d 394, 400 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); City of Lee's Summit v. Collins, 615 S.W.2d
592, 594 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); City of Kan. City v. Mary Don Co., 606 S.W.2d 411,
414 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); see also Tankin v. Jackson County Merit Sys. Comm'n,
599 S.W.2d 25, 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (administrative bodies cannot take judicial
notice of ordinances).
426. See Schweig v. City of St. Louis, 569 S.W.2d 215, 225 n.6 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978); City of Perryville v. Boewer, 557 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
427. See Queen of Diamonds, Inc. v. Quinn, 569 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978). The ordinance must be pleaded either in haec verba or in substance. Schmitt
v. City of Hazelwood, 487 S.W.2d 882, 886 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). Parol evidence is
insufficient. State ex re!. State Highway Comm'n v. Thelnon, Inc., 485 S.W.2d 443,
445 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). Nor is it sufficient to refer to the ordinance by number
only. General Motors v. Fair Employment Practices Div., 574 S.W.2d 394, 400
(Mo. 1978) (en banc).
428. See General Motors v. Fair Employment Practices Div., 574 S.W.2d 394,
400 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); City of St. Joseph v. Roller, 363 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Mo.
1963); State ex rel Freeze v. City of Cape Girardeau, 523 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1975).
429. See Consumer Contact Co. v. Missouri Dep't of Revenue, 592 S.W.2d 782,
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tions... premised on the ordinance will fail. Courts may, however, take
notice of ordinances in municipal violations cases if a certified copy is filed
with the judge's clerk.4"3 Statutes also require judicial notice of extensions
by ordinance of the city limits of a municipality,4 34 the absorbtion of one
municipality by another,4 35 the incorporation of any city,43 6 the change of
name of a city, town, or incorporated village,4 37 and of local census
results.
438
Notice has been taken of gubernatorial proclamations and messages,
43 9
of elections and results, 440 of attempts to enact legislation,4 4 1 of legislative
history contained in legislative journals, 442 and of the records of the General
Assembly.
344
Effective January 1, 1976, the courts shall "take judicial notice, with-
430. See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Weddle, 544 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976).
431. See, e.g., Queen of Diamonds, Inc. v. Quinn, 569 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978).
432. See, e.g., Consumer Contact Co. v. Missouri Dep't of Revenue, 592 S.W.2d
782, 786 (Mo. 1980) (en banc) (taxes); Dae v. City of St. Louis, 596 S.W.2d 454, 455
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (action to enjoin enforcement of ordinances).
433. See City of Lee's Summit v. Lawson, 612 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981); Mo. REv. STAT. § 479.250 (1978).
434. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 71.012 (1978) (any city except those bordering first
class counties with a population over 900,00); id § 71.920 (cities and villages in first
class counties); id § 81.080 (cities of 20,000 or less); id § 81.200 (cities of 20,000 to
250,000); id § 82.090 (constitutional charter cities).
435. See id § 72.350.
436. See id § 77.010 (third class cities); id § 79.010 (fourth class cities); see also
Shelby County R-IV School Dist. v. Herman, 392 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Mo. 1965);
Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 74.013, 75.010 (1978) (repealing provisions for judicial notice of
incorporation of cities of the first and second classes).
437. Mo. REv. STAT. § 71.070 (1978).
438. See id § 81.030.2.; see also id § 490.700.
439. State v. Tippett, 317 Mo. 319, 329, 296 S.W. 132, 136 (1927); Lauck v.
Reis, 310 Mo. 184, 197-98, 274 S.W. 827, 831 (1925).
440. See Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick, 615 S.W.2d 6, 8-9 (Mo. 1981) (en banc); see
also Preisler v. Doherty, 365 Mo. 460, 465, 284 S.W.2d 427, 437 (1955) (en banc)
(senators from St. Louis had been elected and seated); State ex re. McKittrick v.
Graves, 346 Mo. 990, 993, 144 S.W.2d 91, 96 (1940) (en banc) (numerous federal
and state officers elected in 1936).
441. See Estate of Osterluh v. Carpenter, 337 S.W.2d 942, 946 (Mo. 1960); Es-
tate of Gerling, 303 S.W.2d 915, 920 (Mo. 1957); Beal v. Industrial Comm'n, 535
S.W.2d 450, 458 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
442. See Brown v. Morris, 365 Mo. 946, 957, 290 S.W.2d 160, 167-68 (1956) (en
banc); see also Kansas City S. Ry. v. Garvey, 592 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Mo. 1979) (en
banc) (reasons for enactment reflected in emergency clause of bill).
443. See Stateex rel Snip v. Thatch, 355 Mo. 75, 78, 195 S.W.2d 106, 107 (1946).
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out proof, of the contents of the code of state regulations," ' even if the
regulations have been modified or repealed.4 45 Prior to this statute, the
courts could not take judicial notice of the rules of state6 or municipal
administrative agencies,"' and the law still requires that a court reviewing
an administrative decision cannot take judicial notice of rules or regulations
not included in the Code of State Regulations.44 8 An agency can notice its
own rules,"H9 however, and the agency's official record of the rule would
render it part of an appeal.4 50 Agencies also are required to take official
notice of all matters of which the courts take judicial notice, and they may
take official notice of technical or scientific facts not judicially noticeable if
the parties are given an opportunity to be heard.
4 5 1
Missouri courts are required to notice the common law and statutes of
every state, territory and other United States jurisdiction4 52 if reasonable
notice is given to the parties.4 53 Rule 55.21(b) of the Missouri Rules of
Civil Procedure imposes a similar requirement when facts are alleged to
show that such law may be applicable.45 The statute and the rule provide
444. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.031.5 (1978). See State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Whipple,
647 S.W.2d 595, 596-97 n.5 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Willhite v. Marlow Adjustment,
Inc., 623 S.W.2d 254, 261 n.5 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Malveaux, 604 S.W.2d
728, 732 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Crowell, 560 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978).
445. State v. Malveaux, 604 S.W.2d 728, 732-33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
446. See Kersey v. Harbin, 531 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Allen v.
State Dept. of Pub. Health & Welfare, 479 S.W.2d 183, 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972);
State v. Sinclair, 474 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Silas v. ACF Indus., 440
S.W.2d 189, 192 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Missouri Dental Bd. v. Riney, 429 S.W.2d
803, 806 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968). These cases were decided before § 536.031.5 took
effect.
447. Abbott v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 546 S.W.2d 36, 37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (St.
Louis civil service rules).
448. Prokopf v. Whaley, 592 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Mo. 1980) (en banc) (St. Louis
public commissioners' rules). See also Myers v. Moreno, 564 S.W.2d 83, 87 n.2 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1978).
449. Prokopf v. Whaley, 592 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Mo. 1980) (en banc). See also
Consumer Contact Co. v. Missouri Dep't of Revenue, 592 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Mo.
1980) (en banc).
450. Prokopf v. Whaley, 592 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Mo. 1980) (en banc).
451. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.070(6) (1978).
452. See id §§ 490.070-.120 (Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act).
453. Id § 490.110. See McCain v. Sieloff Packing Co., 246 S.W.2d 736, 738
(Mo. 1952); Cohen v. Ozark Airlines, 623 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Ells-
worth v. Worthey, 612 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); In re Marriage of
Bradford, 557 S.W.2d 720, 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Conley v. Berberich, 300
S.W.2d 844, 848 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957); see also Mo. Sup. CT. R. 55.21(b);seegeneral/y
Comment,Judicial Notice of Foreign Law As Developed in Missouri Tort Law, 25 Mo. L.
REV. 176 (1960).
454. See Perry v. Carter, 620 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (citing Mo.
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that the court may inform itself of such laws in any manner as it may deem
proper and it may call upon counsel for aid.455
Missouri courts take judicial notice of the Constitution and laws of the
United States45 6 including executive orders,45 7 presidential proclama-
tions458 and statutes.45 9 Regulations promulgated by federal agencies have
the force and effect of law, and Missouri courts will judicially notice
them.46 ° Notice has been taken of the rules of the Interstate Commerce
Commission,4 6 1 the Federal Aviation Administration,4 62 the Federal Emer-
gency Price Control Act,4 65 and Federal Housing Administration interest
rates.464 Rules promulgated by the Civil Aeronautics Board should, in the
discretion of the trial court, be judicially noticed,465 and notice has always
been taken of official census records.4 66 Missouri courts will also notice de-
SuP. CT. R. 55.21 and Valleroy v. Southern Ry., 403 S.W.2d 553, 555, 557 (Mo.
1966)); see, e.g., In re Marriage of Bradford, 557 S.W.2d 720, 726 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977); see a/so Robinson v. Gaines, 331 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Mo. 1960); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 509.220 (1978).
455. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 490.090 (1978); Mo. Sup. CT. R. 55.21(b); see also
Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 490.020-.030 (1978) (copies of other states' laws may be re-
ceived as prima facie evidence); id § 490.060 (reporters of decisions).
456. Wentz v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 259 Mo. 450, 453, 168 S.W. 1166, 1170
(1914). See, e.g., Perbert v. Repple, 342 Mo. 274, 280, 114 S.W.2d 999, 1002 (1938);
Hall v. Buchner, 240 Mo. App. 1239, 1244, 227 S.W.2d 96, 98 (1950). Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 490.070-.120 (1978) (discussed at note 452 and accompanying text supra)
probably do not apply to laws of the United States. See &. § 490.120; see also id.§§ 490.040-.050 (proof of laws of the United States).
457. In re Estate of DeGheest, 360 Mo. 1002, 1009, 232 S.W.2d 378, 381 (1950).
458. State v. Stoner, 395 S.W.2d 192, 193 (Mo. 1965) (November 25, 1963 pro-
claimed a national day of mourning).
459. See, e.g., Hall v. Bucher, 227 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950) (Emer-
gency Price Control Act).
460. Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 883, 887 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977);
Fredrick v. Bensen Aircraft Corp., 436 S.W.2d 765, 769-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
Notice of regulations published in the Federal Register is required by federal law.
See 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1976). In Allen v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 479
S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972), the court expressed doubt that § 1507 extends to
state courts but declined to finally decide the issue because the matters sought to be
noticed were not cited to the Federal Register. Id at 186.
461. Depass v. B. Harris Wool Co., 356 Mo. 1038, 1041, 144 S.W.2d 146, 147
(1940) (en banc).
462. Insurance Co. of Pa. v. West Plains Air, 637 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982). See also Frederick v. Benson Aircraft Corp., 436 S.W.2d" 765, 769 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1968).
463. Hall v. Bucher, 240 Mo. App. 1239, 1242-43, 227 S.W.2d 96, 98 (1950).
464. Gershman Inv. Corp. v. Danforth, 475 S.W.2d 36, 37-38 (Mo. 1971) (en
banc).
465. Hough v. Rapidair, Inc., 298 S.W.2d 378, 383 (Mo. 1957).
466. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 490.700 (1978) (requires judicial notice of state and
federal census results); see, e.g. Varble v. Whitecotton, 354 Mo. 570, 575, 190 S.W.2d
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cisions of federal administrative law judges.4 6 '




Thousands of Missouri cases have taken judicial notice of a wide vari-
ety of facts, but the trend is to contract the list of things noticeable. Most
recent decisions are concerned with the question of what records a court
may notice. Many others deal with geographical facts, often in the context
of venue. Only a few deal with other types of adjudicative facts. Many
noticed facts are not controversial, and thus no references to them appear in
the appellate cases. Often judicial notice seems to result from a reluctance
to take action which would be required without proof of the disputed fact,
such as overturning a jury verdict.
The apparent decrease in new facts noticed by Missouri courts may
indicate a tendency to notice only adjudicative facts that are clearly com-
mon knowledge or readily ascertainable by reference to authoritative
sources. Despite statements that judicial notice must be exercised cau-
tiously and confined to facts that are notorious,46 9 Missouri courts have ex-
panded common knowledge to include a variety of facts that are not very
well known. For example, the average person's walking speed in feet per
second has been said to be common knowledge.4
Noticing facts not commonly known but capable of verification pro-
motes accuracy and expediency, both goals of a system ofjudicial notice.4 7 1
The problem in noticing disputable facts is the degree of certainty required
before notice may be taken. While the cases do not specifically answer this
question, a fair reading may be that notice is proper if a fact is sufficiently
244, 246 (1945) (en banc); Wilson v. City of Waynesville, 615 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981); see also State ex rel. Kopper Kettle Restaurants v. City of St. Robert,
424 S.W.2d 73, 79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); Kirst v. Clarkson Constr. Co., 395 S.W.2d
487, 497-98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
467. Smitty's Super Mkts. v. Retail Store Employees Local 322, 637 S.W.2d 148,
151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). But see City of St. Louis v. Niehaus, 236 Mo. 8, 15, 139
S.W. 450, 452 (1911) (court would not notice United States Department of Agricul-
ture milk standards); cf Kawin v. Chrysler Corp., 636 S.W.2d 40, 43-44 (Mo. 1982)
(en banc) (FTC regulations refused noticed on relevancy grounds).
468. Lane v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 356 Mo. 76, 82, 201 S.W.2d 288, 291
(1947) (court applied Missouri law in absence of proof of German law); Scott v.
Vincennes Bridge Co., 220 Mo. App. 1213, 1217, 299 S.W. 145, 146 (1927). Sec-
tions 490.070-.120 do not cover judicial notice of foreign law. Compare FED. R.
Civ. P. 44.1, which allows federal courts to determine foreign law by reference to
any relevant source, including testimony. See generally Second Annual Sokol Colloquium
on Private International Law, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 609 (1978).
469. English v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 426 S.W.2d 33, 41 (Mo. 1968).
470. See, e.g., State v. Burley, 523 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
471. Note, supra note 2 at 724, nn.8 & 9.
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likely to be true that it is in the interests of justice to notice it. Because the
Missouri approach to judicial notice offers an opportunity to rebut, it elimi-
nates most problems of inaccuracy while promoting expediency, and pro-
vides greater assurance than Rule 201 that a deserving litigant will not lose
because his attorney failed to produce admissible evidence of a relevant
fact.
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